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POLITICS, LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION IN 
MCCAWLEY’S CASE 
NICHOLAS ARONEY∗ 
[Discussion about the relationship between law and politics in Australian constitutional law is often 
conducted in abstract terms. McCawley’s Case presents a unique opportunity to examine the 
relationship between law and politics in the context of a very rich set of specific circumstances, and 
to do so in a manner which distinguishes between the different dimensions of ‘politics’ and ‘law’, and 
the complex ways in which they can interrelate. With these objectives in mind, this article undertakes 
three tasks. First, it seeks to place McCawley’s Case within the personal, political and legal contexts 
in which it arose, and to show why the case provides a particularly valuable opportunity to test our 
understanding of the relationship between law and politics. Second, the article aims to identify and 
distinguish the various political elements of the case in their personal, partisan and ideological 
dimensions, as well as the competing conceptions of law and constitutionalism upon which the 
judges relied. Third, the article evaluates the role of law, politics and constitutionalism in the case, 
arguing that rather than being purely legal or reductively political in character, the decisions are 
best understood as reflecting contrasting theories concerning the ideal purposes of constitutional 
law and the appropriate location of constituent power.] 
CONTENTS 
I Introduction............................................................................................................. 606 
II Background............................................................................................................. 611 
A Political Context......................................................................................... 612 
B Constitutional Background......................................................................... 619 
C Legal Proceedings ...................................................................................... 621 
D Previous Case Law..................................................................................... 626 
1 Cooper ........................................................................................... 627 
2 Taylor ............................................................................................. 629 
3 Summary........................................................................................ 632 
III Judicial Reasoning .................................................................................................. 632 
A Legal Arguments ........................................................................................ 633 
B Constitutional Theory................................................................................. 635 
1 Fundamental Law .......................................................................... 636 
2 Parliamentary Sovereignty ............................................................ 639 
3 Limits of Constitutional Theory .................................................... 642 
C Political Dimensions .................................................................................. 644 
1 Personalities, Partisanship and Ideology ....................................... 644 
2 Politico-Constitutional Theory ...................................................... 647 
 
 ∗ BA (UNSW), LLB (Hons), LLM (UQ), PhD (Monash); Senior Lecturer, T C Beirne School of 
Law, The University of Queensland. This article is an expanded version of a chapter published in 
George Winterton (ed), State Constitutional Landmarks (2006). I wish to thank Professor George 
Winterton and the Sesquicentenary of Responsible Government Trust established by the New 
South Wales Government for providing funding to support this project. I also wish to thank 
Jonathan Fulcher and Scott Guy for their very capable research assistance. Thanks are also due 
to my colleagues at the Centre for Public, International and Comparative Law — especially Jon 
Crowe, Suri Ratnapala, Jim Allan, Reid Mortensen, Michael White and Nick James — for the 
opportunity to present my findings and to discuss them in a stimulating environment. 
     
606 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 30 
 
     
IV Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 650 
As to my own little matter, the Court reserved its decision … I have no doubt 
that the decision will be adverse — the atmosphere of hostility, political, pro-
fessional, and personal, certainly favours such a result. 
— Thomas William McCawley to Henry Bournes Higgins, 2 February 19181 
I   INTRODUCTION 
The appointments of Thomas William McCawley, first as President of the 
Queensland Court of Industrial Arbitration (‘Queensland Arbitration Court’) in 
early 1917, then as a judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland in late 1917, and 
finally as Chief Justice in 1922, were a series of decisions destined to provoke 
political controversy.2 The establishment of the Queensland Arbitration Court 
was a central plank of the radical reforms proposed by the newly formed Labor 
Government of Thomas Joseph Ryan, 3  and McCawley was hand-picked as 
someone having both the requisite technical skills and political temperament for 
appointment as the Queensland Arbitration Court’s first President. 4  Major 
changes, not only to industrial regulation, but also to the political and constitu-
tional structure of the State of Queensland, were imminent — nothing less than 
the restructuring of the Supreme Court, and the abolition of the Legislative 
Council, which occurred in 1922.5 In this context, McCawley’s appointment to 
the Supreme Court and his later elevation to Chief Justice were seen by detrac-
tors to be part of an attempt by the Labor Government to change the political 
profile of the Court, and to raise the status of the Queensland Arbitration Court 
to a comparable level.6 
When, in December 1917, McCawley presented to the Supreme Court a com-
mission appointing him a judge of that Court, two leading Queensland King’s 
Counsel, Arthur Feez and Charles Stumm, contested the validity of the appoint-
ment on what were said to be ‘purely legal and constitutional grounds’.7 Their 
most significant arguments were that the appointment was contrary to the 
Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) (‘Constitution Act’), and that the Queensland 
Parliament could not legislate inconsistently with this Act unless the relevant 
 
 1 Letter from Thomas William McCawley to Justice Henry Bournes Higgins, 2 February 1918, in 
Papers of Henry Bournes Higgins (National Library of Australia) series 1. 
 2 See generally M Cope, ‘The Political Appointment of T W McCawley as President of the Court 
of Industrial Arbitration, Justice of the Supreme Court and Chief Justice of Queensland’ (1976) 9 
University of Queensland Law Journal 224; Timothy Matthew O’Dwyer, Amici Curiae — The 
Role of the Lawyers in the McCawley Case (MA Thesis, Griffith University, 1994). 
 3 See D J Murphy, T J Ryan: A Political Biography (first published 1975, 1990 ed) 122. 
 4 See Ross Fitzgerald, ‘Red Ted’: The Life of E G Theodore (1994) 88; Justice B H McPherson, 
The Supreme Court of Queensland 1859–1960: History, Jurisdiction, Procedure (1989) 308. 
 5 Constitution Act Amendment Act 1922 (Qld). See McPherson, above n 4, 298–9; O’Dwyer, 
above n 2, 78–9. 
 6 See O’Dwyer, above n 2, 55. 
 7 Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 64; Transcript of Proceedings, R v McCawley (Supreme Court of 
Queensland, Thomas Ryan and Arthur Feez, 6 December 1917) (Queensland State Archives, 
Archive No CRS/207, 1–2). Feez and Stumm appeared as amici curiae. 
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provision in the Act had first been deliberately and expressly repealed.8 Al-
though Feez and Stumm admitted that the Parliament certainly had the power to 
amend constitutional statutes such as the Constitution Act, their contention was 
that it could not do so by implication — that is, simply by passing an Act which 
was inconsistent with the Constitution Act.9 
At first instance, a majority of the Full Court of the Supreme Court upheld 
almost all of the constitutional and other legal objections raised against McCaw-
ley’s appointment. 10  While much of the Court’s reasoning might readily be 
characterised as being ‘purely legal’ in nature, as will be seen, the Court was 
quite prepared to criticise both the Ryan Government11 and the legislature12 in a 
number of significant respects. On appeal, a majority of the High Court upheld 
the decision of the Supreme Court.13  Their reasoning was again couched in 
strictly legal terms, yet once more, the judges were willing to make a number of 
observations of a colourably ‘political’ character.14 However, when the matter 
was taken to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Australian 
decisions were overturned, 15  their Lordships unequivocally finding that the 
Queensland Parliament possessed ‘full power’ to amend the Constitution of 
Queensland simply by legislating inconsistently with it.16 Moreover, the Privy 
Council’s opinion, while at times abstract and theoretical,17 was limited to a 
largely technical review of the relevant Imperial legislation18 which avoided all 
reference to the politics and substantive merits of the appointment.19 
The decidedly political nature of McCawley’s Case,20  juxtaposed with the 
‘strictly legal and constitutional’ aspects of the reasoning, raises an obvious 
 
 8 Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 84 (Cooper CJ). 
 9 Ibid. 
 10 Ibid. 
 11 See Transcript of Proceedings, R v McCawley (Supreme Court of Queensland, Cooper CJ, 3 
April 1918) (Queensland State Archives, Archive No CRS/207, 137). See, eg, below n 131 and 
accompanying text. 
 12 See Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 82–3 (Cooper CJ). See further below nn 241, 287–8, 293 and 
accompanying text. Cf Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 3 October 
1917, 1515 (Thomas Ryan, Premier), where Premier Ryan accused the Chief Justice of Queen-
sland, Sir Pope Cooper, of ‘want of integrity’ in some of his judgments. 
 13 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9. 
 14 Ibid 28 (Griffith CJ), 45 (Isaacs and Rich JJ); Transcript of Proceedings, McCawley v The King 
(High Court of Australia, Griffith CJ and Barton J, 12 September 1918) (Queensland State Ar-
chives, Archive No CRS/206, 299); Transcript of Proceedings, McCawley v The King (High 
Court of Australia, Gavan Duffy J, 10 September 1918) (Queensland State Archives, Archive 
No CRS/207, 310). See also below nn 295–300 and accompanying text.  
 15 McCawley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 106. 
 16 Ibid 112, 125–6 (Lord Birkenhead LC). 
 17 See, eg, ibid 114–17. 
 18 Ibid 117–28. 
 19 The Privy Council did observe, however, that it was ‘intelligible that the Legislature should have 
desired to throw an atmosphere of judicial prestige around one whose duty it was to compose, or 
pronounce upon, matters of industrial dissention, for the duration of this important function’: 
ibid 126. 
 20 ‘McCawley’s Case’ is used in this article to refer to the entirety of the litigation surrounding 
McCawley’s appointment, which includes Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, Re McCawley (1918) 
24 CLR 345, McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9 and McCawley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 
106 (Privy Council). 
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question: were the judges who resolved the dispute politically motivated?21 All 
of the Supreme Court judges who decided the case had been appointed by 
non-Labor governments, and there were allegations that members of the Court 
harboured a political bias against the newly formed Labor Government. 22 
Moreover, the sole dissenting judge, Real J, had a working class background 
(and was prepared to remind the Labor Government of this fact when tension 
between the Court and the Government reached its peak in the early 1920s).23 
The judges of the High Court who heard the appeal were similarly not without 
political connections. Of the majority judges, Griffith CJ was a former Premier 
and Chief Justice of Queensland, and Barton J had been Prime Minister of 
Australia. 24  Moreover, as politicians both Griffith and Barton had been lib-
eral-conservative in political orientation — in sharp contrast to the radical-liberal 
politics of the two minority High Court judges, Isaacs and Higgins JJ, both of 
whom had been federal Attorneys-General.25 Indeed, as President of the Com-
monwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, Higgins held a position that 
corresponded at the federal level to McCawley’s position as President of the 
Queensland Arbitration Court,26 and was not unwilling to correspond privately 
with McCawley about the case itself.27 Further, each of the judges were impor-
tant figures in Australian politics because of their involvement in the debate over 
Australian federation in the 1890s, having taken leading,28 and often opposing,29 
roles in that debate. 
But what does it mean for a legal issue, and its resolution by judges, to be 
‘political’ in nature? There are different, albeit overlapping, degrees to which a 
matter might be characterised as such. First, political controversies may be 
characterised as predominantly ‘personal’ in quality. Here, the contest is essen-
tially one of individual ambition and pursuit of power, coloured perhaps by an 
element of personal aversion and, on occasion, by outright animosity. Second, 
 
 21 On the opposition mounted by Feez, Stumm and other members of the legal profession in 
Queensland, see O’Dwyer, above n 2, ch 4; Helen Gregory, The Queensland Law Society Inc 
1928–1988: A History (1991) 48–55. In J R S Forbes, The Divided Legal Profession in Austra-
lia: History, Rationalisation and Rationale (1979) 166, Forbes observes: ‘It was said from bench 
and Bar table that the challenge was “purely legal” — a protest hardly borne out by the atmos-
phere of the hearing’. 
 22 For background on each of the judges, see Ross Johnston, History of the Queensland Bar (1979) 
49–50, 65–75; McPherson, above n 4, 188–9, 195–7, 199, 253–8. Both authors note allegations 
of political bias on the part of Sir Pope Cooper and Justice Lionel Lukin. McPherson also notes a 
reputation for outspokenness on the part of Justice Patrick Real: at 189, 255. 
 23 Cope, above n 2, 235, 240. See also below nn 143–9 and accompanying text. 
 24 Roger B Joyce, Samuel Walker Griffith (1984) chs 4, 9; John Reynolds, Edmund Barton (first 
published 1948, 1999 ed) ch 15; Geoffrey Bolton, Edmund Barton (2000) chs 11–12. 
 25 See generally Sir Zelman Cowen, Isaac Isaacs (2nd ed, 1993) ch 5; John Rickard, H B Higgins: 
The Rebel as Judge (1984) chs 4, 6. 
 26 See Stuart Macintyre, ‘Arbitration in Action’ in Joe Isaac and Stuart Macintyre (eds), The New 
Province for Law and Order: 100 Years of Australian Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
(2004) 55, 61–71. 
 27 Higgins’ letters to McCawley appear to have been lost. However, see Letter from McCawley to 
Higgins, 2 February 1918, above n 1, which plainly refers to a letter Higgins wrote to McCawley 
that discussed the opposition to McCawley’s appointment. 
 28 See, eg, J A La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution (1974) 169, 278. 
 29 See, eg, ibid 139, 150. 
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political differences may be characterised as ‘partisan’, in the sense that they 
depend upon formal or informal political alliances and party allegiances — the 
typical stuff of contemporary parliamentary politics. Third, political differences 
may be characterised as ‘ideological’. In this sense, the standard political 
classifications, such as ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’, ‘liberal’ and ‘socialist’, 
‘left’ and ‘right’, emerge. 
Political ideologies are, however, more complex than simple left–right di-
chotomies suggest, and they typically involve a number of dimensions, including 
legal ones. Thus, particular political ideologies are often (although not necessar-
ily) taken to imply particular theories about the nature, functions and purposes of 
law. For example, law may primarily be conceived in liberal terms as a facilitator 
of human choices and as a device by which governmental power is controlled. 
Alternatively, it may be conceived in progressive terms as a positive instrument 
of social change, or perhaps, in radical terms as an inevitably conservative 
institution that itself resists change. Moreover, associated with varying concep-
tions of law, political ideology can also imply a certain view of the structure and 
function of the courts, and of the role of the judiciary, as well as more abstract 
ideas about the institutions of the state generally, and of the ideal Constitution in 
particular. In other words, political theory can imply both a theory of adjudica-
tion and a theory of constitutionalism. 
The relationship between political ideology and ideas about law, adjudication 
and constitutionalism is vexed. On prevailing liberal-democratic conceptions, the 
courts and the Constitution are politically neutral institutions which reflect 
fundamental political values that are widely shared by those who are in fact 
opposed in their more everyday personal, partisan and ideological commit-
ments.30 From a liberal-democratic point of view, therefore, a proposed change 
to the Constitution may represent a challenge to the fundamental ground rules of 
politics — with the potential to influence concrete political outcomes. Debates 
over constitutionalism and Constitutions, the law and the courts must, therefore, 
be understood in a context of both political contestation — and are thus political, 
and contested, in the deepest and most profound sense possible — but they are at 
the same time debates over the putatively neutral ground rules of politics. 
McCawley’s Case involved a complicated chain of events that displayed 
political elements in each of these six dimensions — personal, partisan, ideo-
logical, legal, judicial and constitutional — and this article attempts to chart 
these elements. The interesting and difficult problem, however, concerns the 
interrelationship between them. What is, and what ought to be, the relationship 
between ‘politics’ and ‘law’? Here, the debate often centres on the question of 
whether adjudication is, can, or should be based upon law, and not politics. Sir 
Owen Dixon famously insisted that ‘strict and complete legalism’ was the only 
policy that could secure the confidence of the politically engaged.31 Sir Owen 
did not deny that there is a real sense in which political considerations are 
relevant to judicial decision-making, particularly in the context of constitutional 
interpretation. A Constitution is a ‘political instrument’, he said, in that it ‘deals 
 
 30 See, eg, Lochner v New York, 198 US 45, 75–6 (Holmes J) (1905). 
 31 Swearing in of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice (1952) 85 CLR xi, xiv. 
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with government and governmental powers’.32 Considerations arising ‘under the 
Constitution’ are therefore unavoidably political in this sense.33 However, Sir 
Owen insisted that the relevant considerations must at the same time be ‘legal’, 
in the sense that they must be derived from orthodox sources of law, such as 
previous judicial decisions, statutes and Constitutions.34 Others, of course, deny 
that the line can be drawn so easily.35 
McCawley’s Case provides an interesting test case for an enquiry into the 
relationship between law and politics in Australia, for it was an intensely 
political affair which was thoroughly litigated at a state, federal and Imperial 
level. Moreover, it illustrates this relationship at a critical point in the evolution 
of Australian constitutionalism. McCawley’s Case was initiated towards the end 
of the First World War. To a substantial degree, Australia entered that war as a 
colony of the British Empire, but emerged as an independent nation-state.36 
Against this backdrop, McCawley’s Case was principally about the constitutional 
foundations of the Australian states, the constituent political units of the Com-
monwealth of Australia, which was itself a member of a nascent Commonwealth 
of Nations. At stake, therefore, were the constitutional foundations of an emerg-
ing, independent federation of self-governing states. The judgments delivered in 
McCawley’s Case concerned constitutionalism and the fundamental nature of the 
‘polity’ and in this sense they were political decisions of the highest order. Yet, at 
the same time, the case was about the highly controversial appointment of 
McCawley. This controversy occurred at the ‘ordinary’ level of politics and was 
largely fuelled by allegations that personal, partisan and ideological considera-
tions had motivated both the appointment and its opposition. 
The judges called upon to resolve the dispute would have been tempted to 
descend to the ordinary politics of the matter, using the formalistic veil of legal 
and constitutional reasoning to conceal a ‘result-oriented’ decision. The personal 
and political connections of the judges on both sides of the political divide would 
have rendered this temptation a real and powerful one, yet, we must ask: can the 
constitutional reasoning used in the case be dismissed, simply, as ideological or 
partisan rhetoric?37 As will be seen, according to one side in the debate, what 
was at issue was the principle of the separation of powers and the independence 
of the judiciary, as well as the status of the Constitution of Queensland as 
 
 32 City of Melbourne v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31, 82. 
 33 Ibid. 
 34 Ibid 82–3. His Honour emphasised that, ultimately, legal and constitutional considerations 
provided the basis for the imposition of restraints on the power of the Commonwealth. He de-
clared that ‘[i]t is not a question of whether the considerations are political, for nearly every 
consideration arising from the Constitution can be so described, but whether they are compel-
ling.’: at 82. 
 35 See, eg, Brian Galligan, Politics of the High Court: A Study of the Judicial Branch of Govern-
ment in Australia (1987) 38–9; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Realism about the High Court’ (1989) 18 
Federal Law Review 27, 31; Brian Galligan, ‘Realistic “Realism” and the High Court’s Political 
Role’ (1989) 18 Federal Law Review 40, 47–9; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Reply to Galligan’ (1989) 
18 Federal Law Review 50, 51–2. 
 36 See generally R D Lumb, ‘The Bicentenary of Australian Constitutionalism: The Evolution of 
Rules of Constitutional Change’ (1988) 15 University of Queensland Law Journal 3. 
 37 Cf McPherson, above n 4, x. 
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fundamental, organic or higher law. On the other side, was the view that the law 
— and therefore the courts, Parliament and Constitution of Queensland — ought 
to be instruments of social and economic progress, to which a strict separation of 
the judiciary and the executive, and an inflexible attitude to the relationship 
between the Parliament and the Constitution, must give way.  
In this context, how is McCawley’s Case to be understood? To what extent 
were the decisions motivated by political and legal considerations? In this article, 
it will be contended that while both kinds of considerations influenced the 
judges, distinguishing the ‘political’ dimensions of the case into personal, 
partisan and ideological aspects, and the ‘legal’ dimension into theories about 
law, adjudication and constitutionalism, enables a more nuanced assessment. It 
will be argued that rather than being adequately explained in terms which are 
either purely legal or reductively political, the decisions are best understood as 
reflecting contrasting theories of a politico-constitutional character concerning 
the ideal purposes of constitutional law and the appropriate location of ultimate, 
constituent power within the Australian states. 
Part II of this article accordingly places McCawley’s Case within the political 
and legal context in which it arose and shows why the case provides a particu-
larly rich opportunity to test our understanding of the relationship between law 
and politics in Australian constitutional law. Part III turns to the reasoning 
adopted by the judges, examining the respective roles of technical legal argu-
ment, constitutional theory and political motivation in the various judgments. 
Part IV concludes by arguing that McCawley’s Case cannot be explained entirely 
in terms of purely legal considerations, or by reference to its political dimen-
sions. Instead, the case turned ultimately on competing conceptions of the ideal 
Constitution of a self-governing political community. 
I I   BACKGROUND 
Thomas McCawley was born on 24 July 1881, the son of a Toowoomba 
drover, and the sixth of eight children. 38  His father, James McCawley, was 
Irish-born; his mother, Mary (née Stenner), was born in Prussia. As befitted a 
Roman Catholic upbringing, he was duly educated at St Patrick’s Boys’ School 
in Toowoomba. The financial situation of his family meant that McCawley had 
to leave school at the age of 14, working first as a teacher, and soon thereafter as 
a clerk in a solicitor’s office. Shortly before his 18th birthday, he passed the 
public service examinations and was appointed a clerk, first within the Queen-
sland Government Savings Bank, later within the Public Service Board and 
finally within the Department of Justice. He soon became Attorney-General 
James Blair’s private secretary and in this capacity he helped draft the Workers’ 
Compensation Act 1905 (Qld), and shortly thereafter co-authored a commentary 
on the Act with Blair and Thomas Macleod.39 Studying after-hours, he passed the 
prescribed examinations and was subsequently admitted, on the motion of Blair, 
 
 38 For biographical background, see generally Percival Serle, Dictionary of Australian Biography 
(1949) vol 2, 65–6; McPherson, above n 4, 306–9; O’Dwyer, above n 2, ch 1. 
 39 James William Blair, Thomas Macleod and Thomas William McCawley, The Workers’ 
Compensation Act of 1905 (1906). 
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to the Queensland Bar in 1907.40 McCawley’s work within the Department of 
Justice must have been impressive, 41  for in 1910 he was appointed Crown 
Solicitor by Blair under the Liberal-Labor Government of William Kidston.42 
His public service career reached further heights in 1915, when he was appointed 
Under Secretary for Justice under the newly formed Ryan Labor Government.43 
A  Political Context 
The Ryan Government was the first Labor administration in Queensland to be 
elected with a clear majority in the Legislative Assembly.44 True to its platform, 
the Government embarked upon an elaborate reform programme during its first 
term in office that included the establishment of a number of state enterprises, 
the reform of workers’ compensation and the introduction of compulsory voting, 
as well as unsuccessful attempts to dissolve the Legislative Council, to abolish 
the death penalty and to introduce a form of direct democracy through popular 
initiative and referenda.45 This radical reform agenda attracted political opposi-
tion from conservative members of Parliament, particularly in the Legislative 
Council, many of whom were lawyers.46 Moreover, a disposition on the part of 
the Government to use its executive and legislative powers in novel ways, and to 
the fullest extent possible, led to court challenges, and thus to a series of con-
frontations between the Government and the Supreme Court.47 
 
 40 O’Dwyer, above n 2, 12–13, points out that in 1907 McCawley and Macleod also initiated, as 
founding editors, The Queensland Justice of the Peace and Local Authorities Journal, which 
was succeeded in 1973 by The Queensland Lawyer. 
 41 See McPherson, above n 4, 306, who writes of McCawley’s ‘ability and assiduity’. See also 
O’Dwyer, above n 2, 12–24; Johnston, above n 22, 75–7. 
 42 On the opposition to this appointment within the Parliament and legal profession, see O’Dwyer, 
above n 2, 14–16. 
 43 On the close working relationship between Ryan and McCawley, see generally Murphy, T J 
Ryan, above n 3, ch 6. 
 44 Denis Murphy, ‘Thomas Joseph Ryan’ in Denis Murphy, Roger Joyce and Margaret Cribb (eds), 
The Premiers of Queensland (revised ed, 1990) 263, 271–2; D J Murphy, ‘Organization, Struc-
ture and Finance’ in D J Murphy, R B Joyce and Colin A Hughes (eds), Labor in Power: The 
Labor Party and Governments in Queensland 1915–57 (1980) 3, 3. 
 45 Charles Arrowsmith Bernays, Queensland Politics during Sixty (1859–1919) Years (1919)  
183–4; Murphy, T J Ryan, above n 3, chs 5–6. The Labor Government was finally successful in 
abolishing the Legislative Council in 1922. Bills attempting to abolish the Legislative Council 
were passed by the Legislative Assembly in 1915, 1916, 1918, 1919 and 1921: A C V Mel-
bourne, Early Constitutional Development in Australia: New South Wales 1788–1856, Queen-
sland 1859–1922 (2nd ed, 1963) 480. The Parliamentary Bills Referendum Act 1908 (Qld) al-
ready provided for the resolution of parliamentary deadlocks by referendum. A more 
wide-reaching Bill providing for indirect constitutional initiative, indirect legislative initiative 
and voters’ veto was passed by the Legislative Assembly on four occasions between 1914 and 
1919, but failed each time to secure the support of the Legislative Council: see George Williams 
and Geraldine Chin, ‘The Failure of Citizens’ Initiated Referenda Proposals in Australia: New 
Directions for Popular Participation?’ (2000) 35 Australian Journal of Political Science 27,  
33–4. 
 46 See Malcolm I Thomis, Thynne and Macartney, 1893–1993 (1993) ch 4, for the political 
confrontation between the Ryan Government and two leading solicitors, Andrew Thynne and 
Edward Macartney. 
 47 On the tension between the Ryan Government, the Legislative Council and the Supreme Court, 
see McPherson, above n 4, 279–80, who suggests that ‘actual or prospective opposition’ to the 
Government’s initiatives in the Legislative Council led the Government to avoid ‘parliamentary 
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One of the principal legislative initiatives of the Ryan Government was the 
Industrial Arbitration Act 1916 (Qld) (‘Industrial Arbitration Act’).48 In conjunc-
tion with Edward Theodore as Secretary for Public Works, McCawley, as Crown 
Solicitor, played a key role in drafting the Act in its original form.49 While the 
Act was presented as a measure designed to secure ‘industrial peace’,50 it was 
clearly intended to lay the foundations for an arbitration system that would 
strengthen the role of industrial unions and promote the interests of the working 
class.51 
At the centre of the Act was the new Queensland Arbitration Court. Section 
6(1) established the Court and s 6(2)–(3) empowered the Governor-in-Council, 
by commission, to appoint judges of the Court, one of whom was to be desig-
nated President. Under s 6(5), the Court was deemed to be a ‘branch’ of the 
Supreme Court and every judge of the Queensland Arbitration Court was deemed 
to have the ‘status’ of a Supreme Court judge. Section 6(6) provided that the 
President and judges of the Court were to be appointed for a term of seven years, 
and were eligible for reappointment. Problematically, however, s 6(6) of the Act 
also provided that judges of the Queensland Arbitration Court could be ap-
pointed to the Supreme Court, bypassing the specific provisions for the appoint-
ment of Supreme Court judges contained within the Constitution Act, which 
required that they be granted life tenure during good behaviour and which set the 
maximum number of judges at five.52 McCawley was appointed to the Supreme 
Court under Industrial Arbitration Act s 6(6), and it was this provision that 
would be the subject of the constitutional challenge in McCawley’s Case, on the 
ground of its inconsistency with the Constitution Act. 
Under the Industrial Arbitration Act, the Queensland Arbitration Court was 
invested with wide reaching jurisdiction to make binding awards ‘in any 
question arising out of any industrial matter’,53 from which there was no right of 
appeal.54 The Court was thus empowered to determine standard working hours 
and minimum wages so as to guarantee a basic standard of living.55 The Act also 
 
enactment’, preferring instead to use ‘regulations and proclamations’ to achieve its policy goals, 
even though such mechanisms were ‘vulnerable to challenge’. 
 48 On the Act and its background, see generally Ross Fitzgerald and Harold Thornton, Labor in 
Queensland: From the 1880s to 1988 (1989) 25–7; B H Matthews, ‘A History of Industrial Law 
in Queensland with a Summary of the Provisions of the Various Statutes’ (1948) 4 Royal His-
torical Society of Queensland Journal 150, 156–62; Murphy, T J Ryan, above n 3, 122–3, 209, 
212; Fitzgerald, above n 4, 66–9, 85; Cope, above n 2, 224; Bernays, above n 45, 487–9. 
 49 Cope, above n 2, 224. Cf Murphy, T J Ryan, above n 3, 122; Fitzgerald, above n 4, 66; O’Dwyer, 
above n 2, 29–30; Bernays, above n 45, 487. 
 50 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 September 1915, 577 (Edward 
Theodore, Secretary for Public Works). 
 51 See ibid 570 (Edward Theodore, Secretary for Public Works). 
 52 Constitution Act ss 15–17; see also Supreme Court Acts Amendment Act 1903 (Qld) s 3 
(‘Supreme Court Acts Amendment Act’). For further discussion of the constitutional provisions 
for the appointment and tenure of judges, see below Part II(B). 
 53 Industrial Arbitration Act s 7(1). 
 54 Industrial Arbitration Act s 19. 
 55 Industrial Arbitration Act s 9(3)(d)(i), under which the minimum wage was defined as being  
sufficient to maintain a well-conducted employee of average health, strength, and competence, 
and his wife, and a family of three children in a fair and average standard of comfort, having 
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provided for the registration of industrial unions and gave them the right to enter 
into agreements with employers, to be parties to disputes and to be represented 
before the Queensland Arbitration Court.56 Most controversially, the original Bill 
gave the Court explicit jurisdiction to grant preference in employment to 
unionists in particular industries.57 
With partisan motives and for ideological reasons, the Opposition focused its 
attention upon the union preference clause and, in the course of a highly charged 
parliamentary debate, was able to secure the rejection of the Bill by the Legisla-
tive Council largely on this basis.58 At a subsequent conference between mem-
bers of both Houses, the Labor Government agreed to delete the preference 
clause (taking the view that the Queensland Arbitration Court would, in any case, 
have discretion to grant preference to unionists). 59  The Opposition saw this 
backdown by the Government as a victory. However, the Government’s interpre-
tation of the Bill was soon vindicated in a judgment delivered by McCawley 
during the first year of his presidency.60 
By the time of his appointment to the Queensland Arbitration Court, McCaw-
ley had deeply imbibed progressive socialist beliefs. He had read the Fabian 
Tracts and other democratic socialist writings by George Bernard Shaw and 
Sidney Webb.61 McCawley has since been described as ‘a social reformer who 
saw the law as being a potential instrument of reform, rather than remaining an 
instrument of conservatism and reaction against reform’.62 In particular, McCaw-
ley was greatly influenced by Henry Bournes Higgins, President of the Com-
monwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, and Justice of the High Court 
of Australia.63 Correspondence between McCawley and Higgins reveals a warm 
 
regard to the conditions of living prevailing among employees in the calling in respect of 
which such minimum wage is fixed … 
 56 Industrial Arbitration Act s 7(1)(i). 
 57 Industrial Arbitration Bill 1916 (Qld) cl 4(i). See further Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 
Legislative Council, 5 October 1916, 1108 (Frederick Brentnall). 
 58 See, eg, Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 3 October 1916, 1024–6 
(Arthur Hawthorn); Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 5 October 1916, 
1108–9 (Frederick Brentnall); Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 31 
October 1916, 1389–93. 
 59 See Cope, above n 2, 224–5; O’Dwyer, above n 2, 31–2, 50; Murphy, T J Ryan, above n 3, 209; 
Fitzgerald, above n 4, 85; Bernays, above n 45, 488. 
 60 See below n 81 and accompanying text. 
 61 See Cope, above n 2, 228; see also Fitzgerald, above n 4, 66, who calls McCawley ‘an avid 
proponent of Fabianism’. Fabianism was a political movement premised on Sidney Webb’s 
theory of a gradual evolution from capitalism to socialism through various social reforms conse-
quent upon the development of universal suffrage and representative government. The Fabian 
Tracts were a series of popular booklets which applied Fabian theories to various questions of 
public policy: see G D H Cole, ‘Fabianism’ in Edwin R A Seligman (ed), Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences (1931) vol XI, 46–9. 
 62 Denis Murphy, ‘Edward Granville Theodore: Ideal and Reality’ in Denis Murphy, Roger Joyce 
and Margaret Cribb (eds), The Premiers of Queensland (revised ed, 1990) 293, 304, added (with 
perhaps some exaggeration) that McCawley combined ‘a meticulous knowledge of the law and 
an amazing capacity for draftsmanship’. 
 63 D J Murphy, ‘Labour Relations — Issues’ in D J Murphy, R B Joyce and Colin A Hughes (eds), 
Labor in Power: The Labor Party and Governments in Queensland 1915–57 (1980) 246, 249, 
has said that McCawley was ‘something of a disciple’ of Higgins, a view repeated by Fitzgerald, 
above n 4, 66. 
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and courteous relationship, in which they exchanged books 64  and discussed 
various political and legal issues, confiding on a number of industrial relations 
matters which had appeared before them (or would appear in the near future) in 
their respective judicial offices — including McCawley’s Case itself.65 McCaw-
ley was at times effusive in his praise of Higgins. He regarded Higgins to have 
been the ‘sheet anchor’66 of the entire system of industrial regulation in Australia 
and to have contributed ‘a lasting service to the community’ by ‘lifting the 
subject [of industrial relations] out of the domain of party politics’.67 As Presi-
dent of the Queensland Arbitration Court, McCawley would soon show himself 
to be a dedicated disciple of his Victorian mentor. 68  In this context, the  
Higgins–McCawley correspondence relating to the politics of McCawley’s 
appointment69 raises serious questions about the appropriateness of Higgins J 
sitting on the High Court appeal in McCawley’s Case. 
Edward Theodore seems to have been the prime mover behind McCawley’s 
appointment to the Queensland Arbitration Court and the Supreme Court.70 He 
explained that the Government was ‘anxious to secure men of legal standing and 
ability, who were also temperamentally fitted for work of this kind’.71 It has been 
suggested that all Theodore meant by this was someone possessing ‘suitable 
knowledge’ to administer a ‘new form of law’ and that it was in this sense that 
McCawley’s appointment was politically consistent with the values of the Labor 
Party. 72  A similar view was suggested by McCawley himself when he later 
observed that what was required was someone not ‘diametrically opposed to the 
contemporary attitude of intelligent students of industrial problems.’ 73  The 
 
 64 See especially Justice Henry Bournes Higgins, ‘A New Province for Law and Order’ (Pt 1) 
(1915) 29 Harvard Law Review 13; Justice Henry Bournes Higgins, ‘A New Province for Law 
and Order’ (Pt 2) (1919) 32 Harvard Law Review 189; Justice Henry Bournes Higgins, ‘A New 
Province for Law and Order’ (Pt 3) (1920) 34 Harvard Law Review 105, subsequently published 
as Justice Henry Bournes Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order: Being a Review by Its 
Late President of Fourteen Years of the Australian Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (1922). 
 65 Letter from Thomas William McCawley to Justice Henry Bournes Higgins, 20 August 1917, in 
Papers of Henry Bournes Higgins (National Library of Australia) series 2; Letter from Thomas 
William McCawley to Justice Henry Bournes Higgins, 10 October 1917, in Papers of Henry 
Bournes Higgins (National Library of Australia) series 2; Letter from McCawley to Higgins, 2 
February 1918, above n 1; Letter from Thomas William McCawley to Justice Henry Bournes 
Higgins, 17 December 1920, in Papers of Henry Bournes Higgins (National Library of Austra-
lia) series 2; see also Rickard, above n 25, 254–5. 
 66 Letter from McCawley to Higgins, 17 December 1920, above n 65. 
 67 Letter from McCawley to Higgins, 20 August 1917, above n 65. Urging Higgins to write a book 
on industrial issues, McCawley went so far as to say that ‘for the sake of social progress you 
should do so for the world cannot afford to lose your garnered wisdom’: Letter from McCawley 
to Higgins, 17 December 1920, above n 65. 
 68 Higgins’ influence on McCawley is evident in Thomas William McCawley, Industrial Arbitra-
tion (1924). See also the essays by McCawley in which he described Higgins as a ‘great lawyer’: 
Thomas McCawley, ‘Industrial Arbitration in Queensland’ (1922) 5 International Labour Re-
view 385, 408; Thomas McCawley, ‘Industrial Arbitration in Queensland’ (1922) 7 Queensland 
Industrial Gazette 287, 295. 
 69 See especially Letter from McCawley to Higgins, 2 February 1918, above n 1. 
 70 See O’Dwyer, above n 2, 38; Fitzgerald, above n 4, 88; Murphy, T J Ryan, above n 3, 223; Cope, 
above n 2, 228. 
 71 ‘“Temperamental” Appointments’, The Brisbane Courier (Brisbane), 9 January 1917, 6. 
 72 Cope, above n 2, 228. 
 73 McCawley, ‘Industrial Arbitration in Queensland’ (1922) 7 Queensland Industrial Gazette 287, 
above n 68, 290. McCawley argued that for this reason the tenure of Queensland Arbitration 
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Queensland Arbitration Court should be staffed, he said, by men of ‘great 
altruistic qualities’, rather than by those who desired power for its own sake.74 
Altruistic attitudes, suitable knowledge and an intelligent grasp of the issues 
were no doubt necessary qualifications for the position. However also required, 
it seems, was a strong commitment to the ‘progressive’ social objective of 
industrial reform and the alleviation of social injustice through compulsory 
industrial arbitration.75 
McCawley’s sympathy for the Labor Government’s substantive policy goals 
was illustrated from the beginning of his term at the Queensland Arbitration 
Court. Reflecting a particular view or ideal of the law, McCawley declared that 
the Queensland Arbitration Court would not be bound by precedent and strict 
legal rules, but would be guided by ‘equity and good conscience’. 76  As an 
instrument of ‘social justice’, the Queensland Arbitration Court would set wages 
by reference to the cost of living as determined by statistical evidence, but this 
would be modified so as to ensure that workers were guaranteed a ‘fair and 
average standard of comfort’ which would advance ‘as the wealth of the commu-
nity increases’.77 To do so, he continued, the Court would not allow its discretion 
to be fettered by a ‘rigid rule’ based on ‘considerations of consistency.’78 The 
‘new sciences’ of economics, statistics and political science would provide the 
data necessary to formulate industrial awards which would secure the improve-
ment of working conditions and wages.79 In this way, McCawley enthusiastically 
embraced the movement ‘from contract to status’ that the new regime of indus-
trial arbitration embodied.80 
The expectations of the Government were realised — and those of the Opposi-
tion dashed — when in June 1917, McCawley P decided that the Queensland 
Arbitration Court had jurisdiction to order employers to make union membership 
a condition of employment.81 However, the Government’s objective was not 
 
Court judges should be for a fixed term rather than for life, as this would ensure that such judges 
would continue to possess ‘a reasonably modern industrial outlook’: at 290. 
 74 Cope, above n 2, 229 fn 26, citing the private papers of Thomas McCawley. 
 75 See McCawley, ‘Industrial Arbitration in Queensland’ (1922) 7 Queensland Industrial Gazette 
287, above n 68, 287; McCawley, Industrial Arbitration, above n 68, 35–50; McPherson, 
above n 4, 308. 
 76 McCawley, Industrial Arbitration, above n 68, 58–9; see also Cope, above n 2, 229. 
 77 Queensland Government Gazette, Vol 109, No 5, 6 July 1917, 46. Cf Higgins, ‘A New Province 
for Law and Order’ (Pt 1), above n 64, 14–15. 
 78 Queensland Government Gazette, Vol 109, No 5, 6 July 1917, 46. On McCawley’s approach to 
determining a minimum wage, see Murphy, ‘Labour Relations’, above n 63, 246, 249–51. 
 79 McCawley, Industrial Arbitration, above n 68, 34–5, 58–9. 
 80 Ibid 18, 75. McCawley’s reference to ‘contract’ and ‘status’ was in all likelihood an allusion to 
the famous thesis of Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History 
of Society and Its Relation to Modern Ideas (1861) 126, 128, 168–9, and to the ensuing discus-
sion: see, eg, Roscoe Pound, ‘The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought’ (1917) 30 
Harvard Law Review 201, 219; Nathan Isaacs, ‘The Standardizing of Contracts’ (1917) 27 Yale 
Law Journal 34. 
 81 Queensland Government Gazette, Vol 108, No 226, 21 June 1917, 1899; Industrial Arbitration 
Act of 1916 (7 Geo V, No 16) [1917] QWN 11; see also McCawley, ‘Industrial Arbitration in 
Queensland’ (1922) 7 Queensland Industrial Gazette 287, above n 68, 294. On the Opposition’s 
response to the decision, see O’Dwyer, above n 2, 48–51; Bernays, above n 45, 489. 
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only industrial ‘justice’ but also industrial ‘peace’,82 and this implied an attempt 
to arbitrate between the conflicting demands of workers and employers.83 The 
resolution of industrial disputes through arbitration was therefore preferred to 
collective bargaining, even though such a policy placed Ryan, Theodore and 
McCawley in conflict with some of the more militant unions.84 For example, 
when strikes erupted in northern Queensland in 1919, McCawley observed that 
‘the majority of the strikes in the north were due to the desire to punish the 
employers for their departure from the method of collective bargaining and for 
approaching the Arbitration Court’.85 McCawley’s relatively moderate approach 
to industrial relations was reflected in his insistence that award wages should be 
struck at a rate which industry could in fact afford to pay,86 and by his unwilling-
ness to side with those who ‘habitually disregard the provisions of the law.’87 
This conception of law as an instrument of reform undergirded the preference for 
arbitration over collective bargaining. It also dovetailed neatly with the idea that 
the Parliament and the Government should be free of any constitutional con-
straints that would prevent them from efficiently enacting and administering 
laws for the betterment of society. 
In this context, opposition to the Industrial Arbitration Act and to McCawley’s 
appointment was simultaneously personal, sectarian, partisan and ideological in 
character.88 Other more senior lawyers were passed over in respect of McCaw-
ley’s appointments to both the Queensland Arbitration Court and the Supreme 
Court, so the opposition was not without a personal element. 89  Religious 
sectarianism also added an important dimension to the controversy. Ryan, 
Theodore and McCawley were Roman Catholic; their opponents were mostly 
Protestant.90 When the Anglican Bishop, Henry Frewen Le Fanu, entered the fray 
by delivering an entire sermon on the Ryan Government’s various appointments, 
he was answered immediately by the Catholic Archbishop, Dr James Duhig.91 
The resistance was likewise partisan and ideological. Within the arguments of 
 
 82 See, eg, Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 September 1915, 568–9 
(Edward Theodore, Secretary for Public Works). Cf Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916, ss 8(1), 
9(1), (3) (7 Geo V, No 16) [1921] QWN 2, 10 (McCawley P): ‘if justice is the price of industrial 
peace, it is obvious that we are not paying the price, and also obvious that in this respect this 
Court has not the power to do such justice.’ 
 83 See McCawley, ‘Industrial Arbitration in Queensland’ (1922) 5 International Labour Review 
385, above n 68, 390; cf Higgins, ‘A New Province for Law and Order’ (Pt 1), above n 64, 16, 
34, 38. 
 84 Fitzgerald and Thornton, above n 48, 27–36; Cope, above n 2, 230; Murphy, ‘Labour Relations’, 
above n 63, 252. See also Murphy, T J Ryan, above n 3, chs 10–11, 17; Fitzgerald, above n 4, 
chs 3–4. 
 85 Queensland Government Gazette, Vol 112, No 49, 12 February 1919, 426. Cf Higgins, ‘A New 
Province for Law and Order’ (Pt 1), above n 64, 32. 
 86 See Cope, above n 2, 229; cf Higgins, ‘A New Province for Law and Order’ (Pt 1), above n 64, 
17. 
 87 Queensland Government Gazette, Vol 112, No 49, 12 February 1919, 426. 
 88 Cope, above n 2, 224–8; O’Dwyer, above n 2, 35–48. 
 89 See ‘“Temperamental” Appointments’, above n 71, 6; O’Dwyer, above n 2, 38–41, 47; 
McPherson, above n 4, 338–9. 
 90 See Cope, above n 2, 226–7; O’Dwyer, above n 2, 41–2. 
 91 See, eg, ‘“Misuse of Power” — The Anglican Prelate’s View — State Government Criticised — 
“Drifting into the American Method”’, The Daily Mail (Brisbane), 8 January 1917, 7. 
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the opposition, for example, it is possible to discern the liberal-conservative 
values of equality of opportunity and free enterprise, as well as the view that the 
essential task of government and law is to facilitate the operation of the mar-
ket.92 Thus, when Theodore stated that McCawley was ‘temperamentally fitted’ 
for the appointment, the opposition leapt on the political implication.93 Leading 
the attack, Edwin Fowles suggested that the appointment had been made on the 
basis of ‘politics’, ‘religion’ and ‘personal friendship’ rather than ‘merit, effi-
ciency, and seniority’.94 However, William Hamilton, the Secretary for Mines, 
responded that McCawley’s sympathy for the objectives of the Industrial 
Arbitration Act did not mean that the appointment was made on the basis of ‘his 
politics or his religion’.95 Hamilton denied that the decision was political in a 
partisan sense, but was certainly prepared to defend the appointment on the basis 
of ideological affinity.96 
While the controversy surrounding McCawley’s appointment was therefore 
predominantly political in character, it also had a definite legal dimension. 
According to the liberal-conservative political philosophy of the opposition, law 
was understood primarily as a facilitator of private choices and economic 
exchange, as well as a limit on governmental power. On this view, a close 
association between the Government and the courts would undermine the 
independence of the judiciary and prevent it from functioning effectively as a 
constraint on government power. The Leader of the Opposition, William Vowles, 
argued that the idea of elevating industrial judges to Supreme Court status was 
an ‘interference with the existing rights of the present occupants of the Supreme 
Court bench.’97 He also expressed concern that conferring arbitral and judicial 
functions on industrial judges would mix both legislative and judicial power in 
the same office.98 During debate over an amendment that would have given 
judges of the Queensland Arbitration Court tenure for life, Vowles argued that it 
was ‘one of the foundations of our political institutions that the judge should be 
independent, and that was attained by making them irremovable during good 
behaviour.’ 99  Two years later, in relation to McCawley’s Case, Arthur Feez 
 
 92 Cope, above n 2, 225. See Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 10 
November 1915, 1936 (Edwin Fowles), where Fowles expressed his opposition to laws which 
give ‘preference to a class’, rather than ‘merit and efficiency’ together with ‘equality of opportu-
nity’. 
 93 See Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 14 February 1917, 3200–11 
(Edward Theodore). See also criticisms in ‘“Temperamental” Appointments’, above n 71; ‘New 
Appointments — Mr McCawley and Judge Macnaughton — Some Questions Asked — Gov-
ernment’s Chance to Reply’, The Daily Mail (Brisbane), 8 January 1917, 7. 
 94 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 14 February 1917, 3209 (Edwin 
Fowles). 
 95 Ibid 3210 (William Hamilton, Secretary for Mines). 
 96 Ibid. 
 97 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 22 September 1915, 855 (William 
Vowles, Leader of the Opposition). 
 98 Ibid 855–6 (William Vowles, Leader of the Opposition). See also above n 52 and accompanying 
text. 
 99 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 7 October 1915, 1208 (William 
Vowles, Leader of the Opposition); see also Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Assembly, 5 October 1916, 1109 (Edwin Fowles). 
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would maintain that appointments to the Supreme Court should only be ‘be-
stowed’ upon a member of the legal profession ‘who by his integrity, his 
learning, his ability and his experience has publicly proved himself fitted for the 
position.’100 McCawley’s ideological affinity with the Labor Government may 
have made him temperamentally suited to the Government’s objectives, but too 
close an association between the Government and the judicial branch would, it 
was argued, undermine the capacity of the courts to hold the Government 
accountable to the law. It would interfere, in other words, with one of the 
fundamentals of liberal-democratic constitutionalism. 
B  Constitutional Background 
The Constitution of Queensland can be traced to a statute of the Imperial 
Parliament enacted in 1855 which conferred a Constitution upon the colony of 
New South Wales.101 At the time, the territory of what is now Queensland was 
part of New South Wales. However, ss 6–7 of the New South Wales Constitution 
Statute authorised the Queen to alter the northern boundary of New South Wales 
by separating territory from that colony, and to establish the severed country as a 
new colony or colonies. It also empowered the Queen to provide, by Letters 
Patent or an Order in Council, for the government of any new colony, including 
the establishment of a legislature with full power to make further provision in 
that regard.102 
Letters Patent103 and an Order in Council104 issued on 6 June 1859 exercised 
the power conferred by the New South Wales Constitution Statute, creating the 
colony of Queensland and establishing its Constitution. Clause 2 of the Order in 
Council conferred upon the newly established Queensland legislature the power 
to make laws for the colony ‘in all cases whatsoever’. Clause 22 made clear that 
this included ‘full power and authority’ to amend or repeal the Order in Council 
‘in the same manner as any other laws’.105 At the same time, cl 15 of the Order 
in Council adopted ss 38–40 of the Constitution Act 1855 (NSW),106 which dealt 
with the commissions, removal and salaries of judges of the Supreme Court. In 
 
100 Transcript of Proceedings, R v McCawley (Supreme Court of Queensland, Arthur Feez, 6 
December 1917) (Queensland State Archives, Archive No CRS/207, 2). 
101 An Act To Enable Her Majesty To Assent to a Bill as Amended of the Legislature of New South 
Wales To Confer a Constitution on New South Wales and To Grant a Civil List to Her Majesty 
1855 (Imp) 18 & 19 Vict, c 54 (‘New South Wales Constitution Statute’). See Anne Twomey, The 
Constitution of New South Wales (2004) 19–20; R D Lumb, The Constitutions of the Australian 
States (5th ed, 1991) 34–6; Melbourne, above n 45, 443–502. 
102 See McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 29 (Barton J). 
103 Letters Patent Constituting the Colony of Queensland, 6 June 1859 (Imp). 
104 Order in Council Empowering the Governor of Queensland To Make Laws and To Provide for 
the Administration of Justice in the Said Colony, 6 June 1859 (Imp) (‘Order in Council’). 
105 Clause 22 provided, inter alia: 
The Legislature of the Colony of Queensland shall have full power and authority from time to 
time to make laws altering or repealing all or any of the provisions of this Order in Council, in 
the same manner as any other laws for the good government of the colony. 
106 A Bill passed by both Houses in the New South Wales Parliament in 1853 (17 Vict No 41) had 
been reserved for the signification of Her Majesty’s pleasure and was eventually given force, in 
a slightly amended form, as sch 1 to the New South Wales Constitution Statute 1855. The sched-
uled Act is commonly known as the Constitution Act 1855 (NSW). See Twomey, above n 101, 
11–20; Lumb, The Constitutions of the Australian States, above n 101, 16–17. 
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adopting these provisions of the New South Wales Act, cl 15 of the Order in 
Council implemented the key guarantees of judicial tenure and salary which had 
been secured by the Act of Settlement 1701, 12 & 13 Wm 3, c 2 (‘Act of Settle-
ment’). 
Pursuant to a thorough consolidation of the Constitution of Queensland in 
1867, ss 38–40 of the Constitution Act 1855 (NSW) were reproduced within two 
important Queensland statutes, the Supreme Court Act 1867 (Qld) (‘Supreme 
Court Act’), as ss 9–10, and the Constitution Act, as ss 15–17. The scheme of 
consolidation introduced by these Acts was comprehensive, embracing as many 
as 29 Acts and other instruments.107 This included the repeal of the Order in 
Council, but with one very important exception: cl 22, containing the power to 
amend or repeal the Order in Council itself, remained untouched.108 Thus, while 
the location of at least some of the provisions that would prove relevant to 
McCawley’s Case were changed, the basic content remained the same: first, the 
fundamental power to amend the ‘Constitution’, including the Order in Council, 
the Constitution Act and the Supreme Court Act; and second, the constitutional 
protection of the tenure and salaries of judges of the Supreme Court, as en-
trenched by those Acts. 
The enactment of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp) 28 & 29 Vict, 
c 63 (‘Colonial Laws Validity Act’), itself intended to eliminate doubts concern-
ing the powers of colonial legislatures to amend their Constitutions,109 was also 
relevant. Section 2 of the Act provided that any colonial law repugnant to an 
Imperial law, regulation or order would — to the extent of the repugnancy — be 
void and inoperative. Section 5, however, confirmed that every colonial legisla-
ture would have full power to establish, abolish and reconstitute the courts of the 
colony, including a power to alter the constitution of its courts and to make 
provision for the administration of justice within the colony generally. It also 
gave all ‘representative’ legislatures full power to make laws with respect to the 
constitution, powers and procedure of the legislature itself. Section 5 clearly 
reinforced, therefore, the extensive powers possessed by the colonial legislatures 
to amend their Constitutions. However, s 2 maintained the principle that colonial 
laws would continue to be subject to the rule of repugnancy to Imperial laws. 
With respect to McCawley’s Case, this left open the argument that because the 
provisions of the Constitution Act relating to the tenure of judges derived their 
force from the Order in Council (itself authorised by an Imperial enactment), the 
Queensland legislature could not legislate in a manner repugnant to those 
provisions without first repealing them. 
 
107 See McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 31 (Barton J). In 1861, ss 38–40 of the Constitution 
Act 1855 (NSW) were reproduced in Supreme Court Constitution Amendment Act 1861 (Qld) 
ss 5–6. The latter Act was soon repealed, but not before these provisions were embodied in the 
Supreme Court Act and the Constitution Act. 
108 Repealing Act 1867 (Qld) s 3. Clause 14 of the Order in Council was also exempted from repeal, 
but was not critical to the issues in McCawley’s Case. 
109 Colonial Laws Validity Act s 1. 
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The Commonwealth Constitution was also thought to be relevant to McCaw-
ley’s Case. Section 106 provides: 
The Constitution of each State of the Commonwealth shall, subject to this Con-
stitution, continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the 
admission or establishment of the State, as the case may be, until altered in ac-
cordance with the Constitution of the State. 
It could be argued that this provision supported the proposition that the Consti-
tution of each state would have to be amended deliberately and explicitly before 
a state legislature could legislate inconsistently with it. However, this argument 
depended on the meaning of the words ‘altered in accordance with the Constitu-
tion of the State’ — the very question at issue in McCawley’s Case. Section 106 
of the Commonwealth Constitution, like ss 2 and 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act, was therefore relevant, but not necessarily dispositive. 
Finally, the number of Supreme Court judges and the quantum of judicial 
salaries had been progressively increased in Queensland between 1862 and 
1903.110 The Supreme Court Acts Amendment Act had most recently provided 
that the number of judges must not be less than four and must not exceed five.111 
Immediately prior to the issue of McCawley’s commission in 1917, there had 
been in fact five Supreme Court judges, so the appointment of McCawley as a 
judge under the Industrial Arbitration Act was inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court Acts Amendment Act because his appointment increased the number of 
Supreme Court judges to six. Thus, an additional issue in McCawley’s Case 
concerned this inconsistency and the question of whether the Industrial Arbitra-
tion Act had validly amended the Supreme Court Acts Amendment Act in this 
particular. 
C  Legal Proceedings 
The controversy relating to McCawley’s appointments began on 12 January 
1917, when the Governor of Queensland, upon the advice of the Executive 
Council, issued a commission appointing McCawley as a judge of the Queen-
sland Arbitration Court, and designating him President of the Court ‘for a period 
of seven years’.112 McCawley duly began to perform the duties of judge and 
President of the Court, along with Judge Macnaughton, who had been a judge of 
the old Industrial Court of Queensland, and who was appointed judge of the new 
Queensland Arbitration Court at the same time.113 
On 12 October 1917, the Governor, again upon the advice of the Executive 
Council, issued a further commission appointing McCawley a Justice of the 
 
110 See Supreme Court Constitution Act Amendment Act 1861 (Qld); Supreme Court Act 1874 (Qld); 
Supreme Court Act 1889 (Qld); Chief Justice’s Salary Act 1892 (Qld); Chief Justice’s Salary Act 
1901 (Qld); Supreme Court Acts Amendment Act. 
111 Supreme Court Acts Amendment Act s 3. 
112 It is relevant to note that six days later, the Governor gave approval to an Executive Minute 
which fixed McCawley’s salary at the rate of £2000 per annum for the period 12 January – 30 
June 1917, even though, oddly enough, it emerged that the Governor had also agreed to an 
earlier Executive Minute dated 5 January fixing McCawley’s salary at £2000 per annum. The 
existence of the Minute of 5 January became an issue: see below n 130 and accompanying text. 
113 Cope, above n 2, 225. 
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Supreme Court, under which he would hold office ‘during good behaviour’.114 
At a sitting of the Full Court of the Supreme Court on 6 December 1917, 
McCawley presented his commission and requested that the Chief Justice 
administer the oath of office.115 When Feez and Stumm made their objections to 
the appointment on ‘various purely legal grounds’,116 the Court suggested that it 
make a pro forma decision against the validity of the appointment so that the 
matter could be determined ‘in some appropriate manner’ by a ‘Court of Ap-
peal’, being either the High Court or the Privy Council.117 However, McCawley 
asked that the matter be treated as an ordinary matter coming before the Full 
Court.118 Feez and Stumm therefore proceeded to make submissions against the 
validity of the appointment,119 followed by Attorney-General Ryan and H D 
Macrossan, who argued in support of its validity.120 On 12 February 1918, a little 
over two months later, Cooper CJ delivered a lengthy opinion of the Supreme 
Court in which it concluded by a 4:1 majority that McCawley was not entitled to 
have the oath administered or to take his seat as a member of the Supreme 
Court.121 The principal reason for the decision was that Industrial Arbitration Act 
s 6(6), in providing for the appointment of Supreme Court judges for a tenure of 
only seven years, was inconsistent with Constitution Act ss 15–16, and that cl 22 
of the Order in Council, read in the light of Colonial Laws Validity Act ss 2 and 
5, did not give the Parliament power to legislate inconsistently with the Constitu-
tion Act without first expressly amending the relevant provisions of that Act.122 
Real J dissented on the ground that any inconsistency between the Industrial 
Arbitration Act and the Constitution Act must be regarded as an implied amend-
ment of the earlier Act, and thus valid.123 
On 15 February 1918, the Supreme Court further decided that McCawley’s 
appointment as President and judge of the Queensland Arbitration Court was 
unlawful because no salary had been fixed prior to the appointment, pursuant to 
Industrial Arbitration Act s 6(8).124 The Court continued, however, to recognise 
the need for these issues to be finally resolved by some other, more independent 
 
114 It was suggested that Macnaughton had declined appointment to the Supreme Court because he 
had doubts about the legality of the relevant provisions of the Industrial Arbitration Act: ‘Mr 
Justice McCawley’, The Brisbane Courier (Brisbane), 16 October 1917, 6. 
115 See Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 64. 
116 See ibid 63. 
117 Ibid 64. 
118 Ibid. 
119 On McCawley’s active involvement in the case, see O’Dwyer, above n 2, 56–7. 
120 Ryan was Attorney-General at the time as well as Premier: McPherson, above n 4, 289. 
121 Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62; see also Re McCawley (1918) 24 CLR 345, 346. 
122 Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 83–4, 97 (Cooper CJ), following Cooper v Commissioner of 
Income Tax (Qld) (1907) 4 CLR 1304 (‘Cooper’). 
123 Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 97–8 (Cooper CJ), referring to Real J’s dissent. 
124 Ibid 100–4 (Cooper CJ). The argument that McCawley did not meet the qualification for 
appointment set out by Industrial Arbitration Act s 6(7) — namely, being ‘a barrister or solicitor 
of not less than five years’ standing or a Judge of the Supreme Court or District Court’ — was 
rejected: at 98–100 (Cooper CJ). 
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agency. It suggested that all doubts could be put to rest ‘either by the interven-
tion of Parliament or by the decision of some final Court of Appeal’.125 
McCawley immediately applied for leave, or alternatively for special leave, to 
appeal from that decision to the High Court. The High Court, however, declined 
to grant leave to appeal on the ground that the order was not a ‘judgment’ within 
the meaning of Commonwealth Constitution s 73 and Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) 
s 35.126 Having failed on this point, and in order to bring the matter to a head, on 
6 March 1918, McCawley appeared before Judge Macnaughton (in his capacity 
as judge of the District Court), took the oaths required to be taken by Supreme 
Court judges and thereafter claimed all the rights belonging to a judge of the 
Supreme Court.127 An application for quo warranto was then issued by G A 
Carter (McCawley’s successor as Under Secretary for Justice), which initially 
came before Cooper CJ on 8 March 1918, and was heard by the Full Court on 12 
March.128 On 19 March, Feez and Stumm were added as relators to the proceed-
ings,129 and on the same day, Ryan appeared with an affidavit recounting the 
discovery of an Executive Minute of 5 January 1917, gazetted the next day, 
which appointed McCawley as President of the Queensland Arbitration Court at 
a salary of £2000 per annum.130 On its face, this suggested that McCawley’s 
salary had in fact been fixed prior to his appointment as President, so that when 
the Supreme Court subsequently made the quo warranto order absolute, the 
order only related to McCawley’s appointment to the Supreme Court. However, 
on 3 April, Cooper CJ called the parties back to the Court for an explanation as 
to why, upon closer inspection, the relevant gazetted notice, while referring to 
the appointment, contained no reference to the fixing of salary. His Honour 
maintained that: ‘the Court [had been] misled in a very material particular on an 
occasion when they were entitled to expect not only the exercise of the utmost 
care by officials in framing their affidavits but also the observance of the utmost 
good faith.’131 
 
125 Ibid 104 (Cooper CJ). 
126 Re McCawley (1918) 24 CLR 345, 347 (Barton J). Section 73 of the Commonwealth Constitu-
tion limits the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to appeals from ‘all judgments, decrees, 
orders and sentences’. 
127 See McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 14; McCawley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 106, 111 
(Lord Birkenhead LC); McPherson, above n 4, 284; O’Dwyer, above n 2, 68–9; see also ‘Legal 
Notices’, The Brisbane Courier (Brisbane), 7 March 1918, 6. 
128 ‘Mr Justice McCawley — Called on To Show Authority — His Supreme Court Judgeship — 
Argument before the Full Court’, The Brisbane Courier (Brisbane), 13 March 1918, 7; see also 
Murphy, T J Ryan, above n 3, 358. 
129 Order 81 of the Rules of the Supreme Court made provision for the prerogative writ of quo 
warranto upon application by a relator. The writ was abolished by the Judicial Review Act 1991 
(Qld) s 42(1). 
130 See Transcript of Proceedings, R v McCawley (Supreme Court of Queensland, Cooper CJ, 
Lukin J and Thomas Ryan, 15 March 1918 [sic]) (Queensland State Archives, Archive 
No CRS/206); Transcript of Proceedings, R v McCawley (Supreme Court of Queensland, Coo-
per CJ, 3 April 1918) (Queensland State Archives, Archive No CRS/207, 134, 136). Cf Queen-
sland Government Gazette, Vol 108, No 19, 12 January 1917, 26. 
131 Transcript of Proceedings, R v McCawley (Supreme Court of Queensland, Cooper CJ, 3 April 
1918) (Queensland State Archives, Archive No CRS/207, 137). The issue was particularly 
pointed, as a challenge to the good faith of the executive government had been upheld by the 
Supreme Court only the year before: see below nn 155–7 and accompanying text. 
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When Ryan appeared before the Court on 26 April 1918, there followed a 
lengthy and heated exchange. Ryan disputed the jurisdiction of the Court, 
declined to produce or disclose the contents of the telegram in which he claimed 
the Governor had approved the Executive Minute and insisted that the Court 
must accept the terms of the affidavit on its face. Only after extended argument 
did the Court eventually, but reluctantly, allow the original order to stand.132 An 
information for quo warranto requiring McCawley to show by what authority he 
claimed to be a judge of the Supreme Court was ultimately filed on 16 August 
and the Full Court pronounced a judgment of ouster against McCawley on 22 
August.133 
McCawley then initiated an appeal to the High Court, which heard argument 
from 10 to 12 September 1918, and delivered its judgment on 27 September, by 
majority affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court.134 The ground of the 
decision was that McCawley’s commission was unauthorised by law and 
therefore invalid. Two reasons were given. First, Griffith CJ, Barton and Gavan 
Duffy JJ concluded that if the commission was, on its proper construction, for 
life, it would be contrary to the Industrial Arbitration Act, which authorised 
appointment to the Supreme Court only during his tenure as a member of the 
Queensland Arbitration Court.135 Alternatively, reasoned Griffith CJ, Barton and 
Powers JJ, if the Supreme Court commission was, consistent with the Industrial 
Arbitration Act, for a fixed term of seven years, both the Act and the commission 
would be invalid because of inconsistency with the requirement of the Constitu-
tion Act that Supreme Court judges enjoy life tenure, subject to good behav-
iour.136 Isaacs and Rich JJ dissented in a joint judgment on the ground that the 
Queensland Parliament had sufficient power under both the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act and the Constitution Act to legislate inconsistently with the Constitu-
tion Act, 137  thereby exercising its power of amendment by implication and 
authorising McCawley’s appointment for what amounted to a term of seven 
years.138 Higgins J agreed with this conclusion,139 but also found that McCaw-
ley’s appointment was in fact for life, and preferred a construction of the 
 
132 Transcript of Proceedings, R v McCawley (Supreme Court of Queensland, Cooper CJ, 3 April 
1918) (Queensland State Archives, Archive No CRS/207, 171–211). See also O’Dwyer, 
above n 2, 75; Cope, above n 2, 235; McPherson, above n 4, 285, 288–9; J B Thomas, ‘The 
Time of Cooper’ (1989) 14(2) Royal Historical Society of Queensland Journal 61, 72–4. 
133 See McCawley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 106, 111 (Lord Birkenhead LC). The judgment of 
ouster on 22 August 1918 was based on the Court’s opinion of 12 February 1918: see Transcript 
of Proceedings, R v McCawley (Supreme Court of Queensland, 22 August 1918) (Queensland 
State Archives, Archive No CRS/207, 219, 219–31). 
134 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9. 
135 Ibid 27 (Griffith CJ), 43 (Barton J), 80 (Gavan Duffy J). 
136 See ibid 27 (Griffith CJ), 43 (Barton J), 86 (Powers J). Griffith CJ emphasised the inconsistency 
between the commission and the Constitution Act; Barton and Powers JJ emphasised the incon-
sistency between the Industrial Arbitration Act and the Constitution Act. 
137 Ibid 57–8, 63. 
138 Ibid 67. 
139 Ibid 73–6. 
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Industrial Arbitration Act which authorised appointments for life, so that there 
would, in fact, be no inconsistency with the Constitution Act.140 
McCawley thereupon appealed to the Privy Council. Given the general consti-
tutional significance of the case, the Attorney-General for England intervened. 
The matter took some time to be heard, but on 8 March 1920 the Privy Council 
allowed the appeal, reversing the decisions of the Supreme Court and the High 
Court.141 Lord Birkenhead LC delivered the opinion of the Privy Council, largely 
adopting the reasoning of Isaacs and Rich JJ, and categorically affirmed the 
capacity of the Queensland Parliament to amend the Constitution of Queensland 
simply by legislating inconsistently with it.142 The legality of his appointment to 
the Supreme Court having been affirmed, McCawley duly took his seat in May 
1920, while continuing to act as President of the Queensland Arbitration Court. 
Ryan, Theodore and McCawley had seemingly been vindicated, but this came 
at the expense of a rapidly deteriorating relationship between the Government 
and the Supreme Court, not only in respect of McCawley’s Case itself, but over a 
number of other issues.143 When Theodore replaced Ryan as Premier in 1921,144 
he introduced the Judges’ Retirement Bill 1921 (Qld), which required the 
existing judges of the Supreme Court to retire at the age of 70. As might have 
been expected, the Bill was opposed by the judges on the ground that it attacked 
the principle of judicial independence and neutrality. 145  However, Attor-
ney-General John Mullan replied that the Government was proposing something 
entirely within the law since the Privy Council’s decision in McCawley’s Case 
established that the ‘Parliament has an unquestionable right to amend the 
Constitution Act, or any other Act relating to judicial tenure, so long as public 
welfare requires it.’ 146  The Act was passed and came into operation on 31 
November 1921. It meant that Cooper CJ (aged 75), Chubb J (aged 76) and 
Real J (aged 74) were forced to retire from office immediately.147  Feez ex-
claimed that the action was unprecedented;148 The Brisbane Courier alleged that 
the Act was an attempt to ‘remodel the Judiciary more in accordance with 
Caucus ideas’. 149  On 1 April 1922, the Attorney-General announced that 
McCawley would be appointed Chief Justice.150 He held that office until his 
untimely death three years later.151  
 
140 Ibid 69–72. 
141 McCawley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 106. 
142 Ibid 112, 125–6. 
143 See, eg, McPherson, above n 4, 273–7; Cope, above n 2, 238–9. 
144 See generally Fitzgerald, above n 4, ch 4. 
145 See Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 September 1921, 1002–6 
(Real J, appearing before the Bar of the Legislative Assembly). 
146 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 September 1921, 1007 (John 
Mullan, Attorney-General). See also Cope, above n 2, 240. 
147 Cope, above n 2, 240. 
148 McPherson, above n 4, 305, citing The Daily Mail (Brisbane), 31 March 1922. 
149 ‘The Judiciary Changes’, The Brisbane Courier (Brisbane), 31 March 1922, 6. 
150 See the very positive account of McCawley’s career and appointment in ‘The New Judges’, The 
Daily Mail (Brisbane), 3 April 1922, 7. 
151 For obituaries upon McCawley’s death, see ‘Obituaries’, The Brisbane Courier (Brisbane), 17 
April 1925, 6; ‘Justice T W McCawley’, The Brisbane Courier (Brisbane), 18 April 1925, 9; 
‘Late Chief Justice McCawley: Impressive Scenes at State Funeral’, The Daily Mail (Brisbane), 
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D  Previous Case Law 
In order to appreciate the legal and political significance of McCawley’s Case, 
it is important to view it in the context of a number of important constitutional 
controversies in Queensland that came before the courts between 1907 and 
1920.152 
In a series of state insurance cases decided in 1916 and 1917, the Supreme 
Court and the Privy Council were called upon to interpret Queensland legislation 
intended to create a state monopoly over the provision of workers’ compensa-
tion.153 The private insurance companies that brought the matters sought to delay 
the implementation of the state monopoly, thereby clearly challenging a key 
plank of Labor Government policy. It is sufficient here to note that the compa-
nies were not able to delay substantially the application of the law, and the 
outcome of the cases has therefore been characterised as a ‘virtual win’ for the 
Labor Government. 154  The state insurance cases were thus of considerable 
political significance, particularly at an ideological and partisan level. 
In Duncan v Theodore,155 the challenge to the Government involved political 
issues that were not only ideological, partisan and even personal in character, but 
also concerned points of fundamental constitutional law. The case involved the 
compulsory acquisition of privately-owned bullocks by Queensland police under 
the Sugar Acquisition Act 1915 (Qld). In the course of the litigation, the Supreme 
Court, High Court and finally the Privy Council had to adjudicate the remarkable 
allegation that there had been an absence of good faith on the part of the Gov-
ernment in authorising the seizure.156 The case therefore had the potential to 
ignite an acute confrontation between the courts and the Government which 
could not fail to have significant political ramifications. But when Viscount 
Haldane delivered the opinion of the Privy Council holding that the good faith of 
the executive could never be questioned in a court of law,157 the Government 
enjoyed yet another victory, both constitutionally and politically. 
Despite their constitutional significance, the Duncan v Theodore cases con-
cerned the executive power of the Queensland Government, so their relevance to 
 
18 April 1925, 12; ‘Late Chief Justice McCawley — Impressive Scenes at Funeral Ceremony — 
Vast City Concourse Views Long Cortege’, The Telegraph (Brisbane), 18 April 1925, 4; ‘Queen-
sland Mourns Her Noble Son’, The Worker (Brisbane), 23 April 1925, 1; ‘A Great Australian 
Dead — Sudden and Tragic Death of Chief Justice McCawley’, The Age (Melbourne), 25 April 
1925, 8–10; ‘The Late President — Chief Justice McCawley’ (1925) 10(5) Queensland Indus-
trial Gazette 340. 
152 See McPherson, above n 4, 279–87. On McCawley’s own involvement as Crown Solicitor in the 
first two of these sets of cases, see O’Dwyer, above n 2, 20–4. 
153 Australian Alliance Insurance Co v A-G (Qld) [1916] QSR 135; Australian Alliance Insurance 
Co v Goodwyn [1916] QSR 225; Australian Alliance Insurance Co v A-G (Qld) [1917] AC 537. 
154 See ‘Workers Compensation — State Monopoly Challenged’, The Daily Mail (Brisbane), 14 
June 1916, 9. 
155 (1919) 26 CLR 276. 
156 Duncan v Theodore [1917] QSR 250; Duncan v Theodore (1917) 23 CLR 510; see also 
Duncan v Queensland (1916) 22 CLR 556. 
157 Duncan v Theodore (1919) 26 CLR 276, 282. This proposition remained a part of Australian law 
until R v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170, 192–3 (Gibbs CJ), 202–
4 (Stephen J), 221–4 (Mason J), 265 (Aickin J), 283–4 (Wilson J). 
     
2006] Politics, Law and the Constitution 627 
     
the issues in McCawley’s Case was tangential at best. However, in two further 
cases, Cooper 158  and Taylor v Attorney-General (Qld), 159  the constitutional 
powers of the Queensland Parliament were directly in issue. Indeed, much of the 
constitutional reasoning in McCawley’s Case would be derived from Cooper and 
Taylor. It is therefore necessary to discuss these two cases in some detail. 
1 Cooper 
Cooper involved a constitutional challenge to a series of income tax statutes 
brought by the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Sir Pope Cooper. The 
Chief Justice, on behalf of the Court, argued that the enactments, in purporting to 
impose a tax on their judicial salaries, were inconsistent with the Constitution of 
Queensland. Clause 16 of the Order in Council and s 17 of the Constitution Act 
both provided that ‘such salaries as are settled upon … Judges of the Supreme 
Court’ should be ‘paid and payable … so long as the patents or commissions of 
them … shall continue and remain in force’. It was argued that the income tax 
statutes constituted a ‘reduction or diminution’ of their judicial salaries, contrary 
to the guarantee secured by these provisions. As such, the case involved a 
remarkable confrontation between the judges and the Government over two very 
fundamental constitutional issues: first, the independence of the judiciary, and 
second, the legislative powers of the Queensland Parliament. Of course, these 
were precisely the issues that had to be considered in McCawley’s Case. 
When the Commissioner for Income Tax for the State of Queensland claimed 
from Sir Pope the payment of income tax on his salary, Sir Pope resisted 
payment on the ground that the taxing statutes were unconstitutional and void. A 
police magistrate upheld Sir Pope’s argument, but this was reversed by a District 
Court judge and by the Supreme Court itself.160 The High Court rejected his 
appeal, on the principal ground that the income tax statutes were not inconsistent 
with the relevant provisions of the Constitution of Queensland. While the 
provisions of the Order in Council and the Constitution Act prevented any 
‘reduction or diminution’ of a judicial salary during a term of office, it was held 
that a general tax on the aggregate income of all taxpayers, derived from all 
sources, was not a deduction from the judge’s salary.161 
However, Griffith CJ (with whom, significantly, Isaacs J agreed), as well as 
Barton and O’Connor JJ, addressed the more fundamental issue raised by the 
case: whether the power to amend the Constitution Act includes a capacity to 
amend it by implication, by merely legislating in a manner inconsistent with the 
Act. On this point, all of the judges except Higgins J considered that the Consti-
tution Act would have to be deliberately repealed before the Parliament could 
 
158 (1907) 4 CLR 1304. 
159 (1917) 23 CLR 457 (‘Taylor’); see also Taylor v A-G (Qld) [1917] QSR 208. See further 
Fielding v Thomas [1896] AC 600, 610 (Lord Halsbury LC), which dealt with an amendment to 
the Nova Scotia Constitution, as cited in McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 53–4 (Isaacs 
and Rich JJ). 
160 See Re Income Tax (Consolidated) Acts, 1902–1904, and the Income Tax Declaratory Act of 
1905 [1907] QSR 110.  
161 Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1315–16 (Griffith CJ), 1319–20 (Barton J), 1321–6 (O’Connor J), 
1331–4 (Higgins J). Isaacs J agreed with Griffith CJ: at 1329. 
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legislate in a manner (otherwise) inconsistent with it — and even Higgins J was 
prepared to accept this proposition for the purposes of argument.162 
The decision in Cooper was thus very relevant to the issues raised in McCaw-
ley’s Case. One particular question that the Supreme Court had to consider in 
McCawley’s Case was the extent to which the opinions expressed by members of 
the High Court in Cooper on the question of implied repeal were in fact binding, 
since the conclusion that there was no inconsistency with the Constitution Act 
was sufficient to decide the case.163 After closely reviewing the High Court 
judgments, the Supreme Court in McCawley’s Case concluded that it was bound 
by what was held with regard to that fundamental question.164 After all, Grif-
fith CJ and O’Connor J had characterised the question of implied repeal as being 
of ‘great’ 165  and ‘far-reaching’ importance, 166  and Barton J seems to have 
agreed.167 Griffith CJ and Barton J thus addressed the implied repeal question 
first and the inconsistency question second, treating them both as determina-
tive.168 Notably, however, O’Connor J pointed out that the implied repeal issue 
was ‘not essential’ to the determination of the case,169 and addressed the question 
after the inconsistency point only because of its sweeping significance. 170 
Moreover, Higgins J thought that the ‘curious and delicate points’171 raised by 
the constitutional issue could be avoided altogether, and decided the matter 
solely on the basis of the inconsistency issue.172 His Honour expressed the view 
that if the implied repeal should ever come up for definite decision then 
it will be well if it can be approached as a fresh subject uninfluenced by any 
expression of opinion made in a case that has been solved on other and nar-
rower grounds. I do not think that the mind bestows the same searching scru-
 
162 Ibid 1311–15 (Griffith CJ), 1317–18 (Barton J), 1326–9 (O’Connor J), 1329 (Isaacs J), 1331 
(Higgins J). 
163 Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 91 (Cooper CJ). 
164 Ibid 97 (Cooper CJ). In coming to this conclusion, the importance of the question of implied 
repeal was emphasised and the judgments of Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ in Cooper 
were characterised as containing ‘weighty’, ‘clear’ and ‘explicit’ expressions of opinion to which 
the Supreme Court was bound until they were displaced by a subsequent decision of equal or 
greater authority: see at 88, 97 (Cooper CJ). See also the description of the judgments of Grif-
fith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ as ‘very decided opinion[s]’: at 85 (Cooper CJ). 
165 Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1311 (Griffith CJ). 
166 Ibid 1326 (O’Connor J). 
167 The tone and organisation of Barton J’s judgment reflected the importance he attributed to the 
issue: see ibid 1317–18. See especially the unequivocal character of Barton J’s opening words: 
‘The legislation of a body created by and acting under a written charter or constitution is valid 
only so far as it conforms to the authority conferred by that instrument of government’: at 1317. 
Higgins J also thought the case involved ‘a principle of the greatest importance’: at 1329. How-
ever, this was not the question of implied repeal but of ‘the independence and purity’ of the 
courts as guaranteed by the protection of judicial salaries against diminution during office: at 
1330 (Higgins J). 
168 Ibid 1311–15 (Griffith CJ), 1317–18, 1320 (Barton J). 
169 Ibid 1320, 1326. 
170 Ibid 1326–9. 
171 Ibid 1331. 
172 Ibid. 
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tiny on a point which is not necessary for a decision as on a point which is nec-
essary.173 
That the expressions of opinion in Cooper concerning implied repeal were 
mere obiter would prove to be critical to the dissenting joint judgment of Isaacs 
and Rich JJ in McCawley v The King174 (upon which the Privy Council heavily 
relied). This is especially so given that Isaacs J had, in Cooper and again in 
Baxter v Ah Way, 175  expressed agreement with the judgment of Griffith CJ, 
which contained fundamental statements of principle which flatly contradicted 
the conclusions adopted by Isaacs and Rich JJ in McCawley v The King.176 
2 Taylor 
Whereas Cooper suggested that the Constitution of Queensland was in the 
nature of a ‘fundamental law’ and rejected the possibility of ‘implied repeal’,177 
the decision of the High Court in Taylor178 emphasised quite the opposite idea: 
namely, that the Queensland Parliament had ‘full power’ to legislate with respect 
to its own ‘constitution’.179 
The two critical questions that had to be addressed in Taylor were whether the 
Parliamentary Bills Referendum Act 1908 (Qld) (‘Referendum Act’) had been 
validly enacted and whether there was power under the Constitution Act to 
abolish the Legislative Council by a statute passed in accordance with the special 
procedures stipulated under the Referendum Act.180 The Referendum Act pro-
vided that if a Bill was twice passed by the Legislative Assembly and each time 
rejected by the Legislative Council, the Bill could nonetheless be presented to 
the Governor for royal assent if the Bill were to be approved by a majority of 
Queensland voters in a referendum. The Referendum Act thus purported to 
qualify the requirement that the Legislative Council consent to legislation, a step 
that was inconsistent with the Constitution Act as it then stood. While the Act 
‘professed’ to be an amendment of the Constitution Act, its operative provisions 
were, as Barton J observed, ‘merely … at variance’ with the Constitution Act.181 
 
173 Ibid 1331–2. 
174 (1918) 26 CLR 9. 
175 (1909) 8 CLR 626, 643 (citations omitted), where Isaacs J categorically affirmed the principle 
that: 
the power of the legislature must depend upon the terms of the Constitution as it exists at the 
given moment. It is not a sound argument that, because a change might be deliberately made 
by Parliament in a Constitution, therefore any ordinary Act whatever may be passed, though in 
contravention of constitutional provisions as they stand. The case of Cooper v Commissioner 
of Income Tax, is a clear authority against such a contention. 
176 (1918) 26 CLR 9, 66. 
177 (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1313 (Griffith CJ), 1317 (Barton J), 1327 (O’Connor J), 1329 (Isaacs J), 
1333 (Higgins J). 
178 (1917) 23 CLR 457, overruling Taylor v A-G (Qld) [1917] QSR 208; see also Taylor v A-G (Qld) 
[1918] QSR 194. 
179 See Colonial Laws Validity Act s 5. For the five questions that came before the High Court on a 
special case stated, see Taylor (1917) 23 CLR 457, 467 (Barton J). 
180 The referendum to abolish the Legislative Council held in 1917 under the Referendum Act was 
in fact unsuccessful. However, the decision, together with the result in the case of McCaw-
ley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, provided the necessary constitutional foundation for the suc-
cess of a later legislative attempt in 1922: see Constitution Act Amendment Act 1922 (Qld). 
181 Taylor (1917) 23 CLR 457, 469. 
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This raised the same question that had arisen in Cooper, which would also 
shortly arise in McCawley’s Case: namely, whether the Referendum Act could 
amend or repeal the Constitution Act by implication, or whether it would have to 
be preceded first by a deliberate and explicit constitutional amendment.182 
On this last question, the Supreme Court held, following Cooper, that the 
Referendum Act was simply invalid.183 However, when the matter came before 
the High Court, Barton J acknowledged that he himself had ‘a great deal of 
doubt’ about the matter and ‘for some time’ had been ‘much impressed’ by the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court.184 His Honour also considered that the decision 
in Cooper would ‘normally’ be applicable, with the result that the Referendum 
Act would be invalid on the ground of its inconsistency with the Constitution 
Act.185 Yet, after further considering the matter, Barton J concluded that Colonial 
Laws Validity Act s 5 nullified the application of the principle in Cooper in 
respect of the particular kind of legislation that it authorised. 186  Section 5 
provided that every representative legislature of a British colony would have 
‘full power to make laws respecting the constitution, powers and procedure of 
such legislature’. According to Barton J, the Referendum Act was a law ‘respect-
ing’ the powers and procedure of the legislature, and thus s 5 covered the case.187 
The other members of the High Court appeared to agree.188 Isaacs, Gavan Duffy 
and Rich JJ said that the ‘plain [and] natural meaning’ of the words used in the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act amply covered the legislation in question.189 The 
decision of the High Court on this central point was unanimous. 
The High Court was also unanimous in concluding that there was power under 
the Constitution Act to abolish the Legislative Council through a law passed 
under the referendum procedure.190 In coming to this conclusion, however, the 
Court had to address the argument that the power in Colonial Laws Validity Act 
s 5 could not extend to the alteration of certain features of the Queensland 
Parliament that were deemed ‘essential’.191 
The first of these fundamentals was relatively easy to establish. The power 
relied upon in s 5 was conferred only upon ‘representative legislatures’, and was 
 
182 See ibid. 
183 Taylor v A-G (Qld) [1917] QSR 208, 241 (Lukin J). 
184 Taylor (1917) 23 CLR 457, 467–8. 
185 Ibid 469. 
186 Ibid 469–70. 
187 Ibid; see also at 480 (Powers J). 
188 Ibid 472–4 (Isaacs J), 477 (Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ), 481 (Powers J). Notably, in Taylor, the 
second limb of Colonial Laws Validity Act s 5 was specifically relevant and relied upon by the 
Court, whereas in McCawley’s Case, the first limb was in issue: see, eg, McCawley v The King 
(1918) 26 CLR 9, 53 (Isaacs and Rich JJ). The Court would recognise two important differences 
between the two limbs. The first difference was that while the first limb dealt with the judicature, 
the second dealt with the constitution of the legislature: see McCawley v The King (1918) 26 
CLR 9, 53 (Isaacs and Rich JJ). The second difference was that the first limb applied to all 
colonies, whereas the second applied only to colonies possessing ‘representative’ legislatures: 
see Taylor (1917) 23 CLR 457, 468 (Barton J), 474 (Isaacs J). 
189 Taylor (1917) 23 CLR 457, 474 (Isaacs J), 477 (Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ). 
190 Ibid 470 (Barton J), 476 (Isaacs J), 477–8 (Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ), 481 (Powers J). 
191 This was the view taken by Cooper CJ and Lukin J in the Supreme Court: Taylor v A-G (Qld) 
[1917] QSR 208, 239 (Lukin J), referring to his views and those of Cooper CJ. 
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a power to make laws with respect to the constitution of ‘such [a] legislature’. It 
therefore appeared to all members of the Court that the power conferred by s 5 
could not be used to abolish the representative character of the Parliament.192 
The second fundamental was more difficult, in so far as it did not rely on the 
actual words used in s 5.193 The plaintiffs had argued that if s 5 were read 
without qualification, it would ‘authorize the total elimination of the Crown as 
part of the legislature.’194 Isaacs J (with whom Powers J agreed), responded that 
the reference to ‘the Legislature’ in s 5 did not include the Crown, but referred 
only to the Houses of Parliament. The reason for this was that it was a ‘funda-
mental conception’, basic to the ‘very nature of our constitution as an Empire’, 
that the Crown could not be included in the ‘ambit of such a power.’195 
Barton and Isaacs JJ also had to address the fact that they had concurred in the 
decision in Cooper. For Barton J, s 5 was simply conclusive; how it could make 
all the difference in Taylor and not in Cooper was not explained.196 For Isaacs J, 
Cooper was likewise ignored, except on another point altogether: that cl 22 of 
the Order in Council was yet another fundamental element of the Constitution of 
Queensland — it too could not be repealed, either using the power that cl 22 
itself conferred, or by the power conferred by Colonial Laws Validity Act s 5. As 
Isaacs J put it, ‘clause 22 stood, and … still stands, as a permanent power of the 
Queensland Legislature outside the express working provisions of the Constitu-
tion for the time being.’197 
Barton and Isaacs JJ’s judgments in Taylor thus appear to be quite inconsistent 
with their respective decisions in Cooper. Barton J’s judgment also seems to be 
completely inconsistent with his decision in McCawley’s Case. 
Isaacs J’s judgment in Taylor is noteworthy for two further reasons. First, we 
find in his judgment a concern for the ‘plain meaning’ of the ‘text’ awkwardly 
juxtaposed against the extra-textual idea of a ubiquitous Imperial Crown as a 
‘fundamental’ of the British, Australian and Queensland Constitutions. Notably, 
an insistence upon textual literalism together with a belief in the fundamentality 
of the Crown — indivisible and omnipresent — was one of the critical (and 
perplexing) features of the reasoning of the joint judgment in the more famous 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd,198 a decision 
which Isaacs J is reputed to have drafted.199 The extra-textuality of this latter 
conception suggests, at least, that Isaacs J’s resistance to other ‘fundamentals’ in 
McCawley’s Case (that is, the idea of the Constitution as ‘fundamental law’) and 
in the Engineers’ Case (that is, the implied immunities and reserved powers 
doctrines derived from the idea of ‘federalism’), cannot be interpreted simply as 
an outworking of a rigorous and consistent textualism. For Isaacs J, what was at 
 
192 Taylor (1917) 23 CLR 457, 468 (Barton J), 474 (Isaacs J), 477 (Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ), 481 
(Powers J). 
193 See A-G (NSW) v Trethowan (1931) 44 CLR 394, 432 (Dixon J), 445 (McTiernan J). 
194 Taylor (1917) 23 CLR 457, 473 (Isaacs J). 
195 Ibid 474 (Isaacs J), 481 (Powers J). 
196 Ibid 468–9. See also at 473–4 (Isaacs J). 
197 Ibid 476. 
198 (1920) 28 CLR 129 (‘Engineers’ Case’). 
199 See Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (1967) 130. 
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issue in Taylor was the capacity of a ‘self-governing community’ to determine 
what combination of institutions would be ‘sufficient as its organ of legisla-
tion’.200 
A similar conception of what it meant for a political community to be 
‘self-governing’ would likewise underlie, as will be seen, his Honour’s commit-
ment to parliamentary sovereignty in McCawley’s Case, not to mention the 
expansive view of Commonwealth legislative power that was articulated in the 
Engineers’ Case. In this sense, Isaacs J was prepared to articulate a profoundly 
‘political’ conception of what the ‘Constitution’ is and should be, a conception 
which cannot be defended simply by reference to literalism or legalism. This 
does not mean, however, that Isaacs J’s judgments can be dismissed simply as 
ideological and outcome-oriented. Barton J — as well as Griffith CJ and the 
other judges in McCawley’s Case — likewise had their own ‘political’ concep-
tions of the ideal Constitution. Indeed, as will be seen, McCawley’s Case would 
be the opportunity for these judges to articulate their respective hopes and 
aspirations regarding the constitutional foundations of the Australian political 
system. 
3 Summary 
As politically and constitutionally momentous as Cooper and Taylor were, it 
has been said with good reason that McCawley’s Case was ‘by far the most 
important’.201 McCawley’s Case concerned not only the status and independence 
of the Supreme Court, but also the fundamental power of the Queensland 
Parliament to alter the Constitution of Queensland itself.202 Since the Constitu-
tion Act derived from a series of Imperial enactments which themselves gave the 
Queensland legislature power to alter the Constitution of Queensland, the case 
involved the allocation of ultimate politico-constitutional authority in Queen-
sland — the most fundamental of constitutional questions. When in 1920 the 
Privy Council concluded that the Parliament of Queensland was, for all intents 
and purposes, in a position analogous to the Imperial Parliament itself, there 
could be no doubt as to whether the Parliament had power to recompose the 
Supreme Court and to abolish the Legislative Council. For all practical purposes, 
the Queensland Parliament was in the position of a sovereign legislature. 
I I I   JUDICIAL REASONING 
What, then, was the reasoning that led the judges in McCawley’s Case, as well 
as in Cooper and Taylor, to their respective conclusions? To what extent was the 
reasoning ‘strictly legal and constitutional’? To what extent was it ‘political’? 
 
200 (1917) 23 CLR 457, 474. 
201 McPherson, above n 4, 283. 
202 See ibid 284, where McPherson suggests that the Ryan Government deliberately delayed 
appointing McCawley to the Supreme Court until after the High Court’s decision in Taylor 
(1917) 23 CLR 457. On doubts within the Government and on the part of Judge Macnaughton, 
see O’Dwyer, above n 2, 53–4. 
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A preliminary point to note when considering the arguments on either side of 
the debate in McCawley’s Case is the fact that the legal texts, as they stood, did 
not directly address the question of implied repeal of the Constitution Act. 
Indeed, the texts were quite consistent with either answer to this question, so that 
its resolution depended not simply on the relevant constitutional documents, but 
also on the wider constitutional theories which informed either side of the 
debate. And these rival theories were liable, as the Privy Council put it, to be 
‘carried to every proper consequence with logical and inexorable precision’.203 
The underlying premises on each side of the argument entailed a complicated 
series of implications and corollaries, such that it is possible to describe and 
summarise the arguments invoked in various ways, placing the emphasis on one 
or another of the various lines of logical implication. However, two constitu-
tional theories dominated the reasoning: one that was premised upon the idea 
that the Constitution of Queensland was a kind of ‘fundamental law’, and the 
other premised on a conception of the Queensland Parliament as a kind of 
‘sovereign legislature’. While these conceptions were expressed primarily in 
legal and constitutional terms, each tended to reflect a particular legal ideology 
— a model of what the law ought to be, understood as a matter of constitutional 
theory and, indeed, a particular political conception of what an ideal Constitution 
would look like. 
This Part aims to explain the various ingredients on both sides of the debate. It 
begins with the specific legal arguments and interpretations of the written law, 
before turning to the various explicit references to constitutional and legal theory 
articulated throughout the judgments. The Part then concludes by closely 
analysing the fundamental political principles and assumptions that underpinned 
the constitutional and legal dimensions of the argument. 
A  Legal Arguments 
As discussed, a number of foundational constitutional texts were relevant to 
McCawley’s Case, including: the New South Wales Constitution Statute; the 
Constitution Act; the Supreme Court Act; the Order in Council, especially cls 15, 
16 and 22; Colonial Laws Validity Act s 5; and Commonwealth Constitution 
s 106.204 
It was accepted by both sides of the debate that, as statutes and orders derived 
ultimately from the Imperial authority of the United Kingdom Parliament, these 
Acts operated within Australia with paramount force, such that any colonial law 
repugnant to them would ‘remain absolutely void and inoperative’, as s 2 of the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act affirmed. 205  The judges who found McCawley’s 
appointment to be unconstitutional — such as Griffith CJ, Barton and 
O’Connor JJ — focused determinedly on the paramount force of Imperial law. 
Their Honours reasoned that such force attached not only to the relevant Imperial 
 
203 McCawley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 106, 115 (Lord Birkenhead LC). 
204 See above Part II(B). 
205 See Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1315 (Griffith CJ), 1329 (O’Connor J); Taylor (1917) 23 CLR 
457, 476 (Isaacs J); McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 24–5 (Griffith CJ), 73 (Higgins J); 
McCawley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 106, 121 (Lord Birkenhead LC). 
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enactments, but also to the two consolidating statutes of the Queensland Parlia-
ment: the Constitution Act and the Supreme Court Act, both of which re-enacted 
the protections accorded to the judiciary previously contained in the Order in 
Council. 206  Even though Parliament clearly had the power to amend, to the 
extent to which it sought fit, these ‘ordinary’ statutes which now embodied the 
‘constitutional’ protections accorded to the judiciary, it was argued that these 
protections continued to have paramount force until repealed. This was because 
their legal force was ultimately derived from an Imperial statute and they were a 
verbatim re-enactment of provisions originally contained therein. 207  Unless 
amendments were first made to the guarantee of life tenure for Supreme Court 
judges, s 6(6) of the Industrial Arbitration Act — which allowed judges to be 
appointed for a limited term of years — would be void for repugnancy.208 Since 
no amendments had been made to the two constitutional statutes prior to the 
enactment of the Industrial Arbitration Act, it followed that s 6(6) was invalid, 
thus rendering McCawley’s appointment to the Supreme Court under that section 
illegal and ineffective.209 
On the other hand, the reasoning of those judges who found McCawley’s 
appointment to be legally valid — Isaacs and Higgins JJ, as well as Lord 
Birkenhead LC — focused upon the virtually unlimited scope of the legislative 
and constitutive power initially conferred upon the Queensland Parliament by 
cl 22 of the Order in Council. This power was taken up by Constitution Act s 2, 
and was confirmed under Colonial Laws Validity Act s 5.210 In light of these 
provisions, the Constitution Act was considered to be nothing more than an 
ordinary statute amenable to subsequent alteration or repeal by another statute.211 
Moreover, according to general principles of statutory interpretation, a later 
statute could amend an earlier one either by expressly and deliberately doing so, 
or merely by containing provisions inconsistent with it.212 Because Industrial 
Arbitration Act s 6(6) was in fact inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution Act, this had the effect, it was concluded, of amending the earlier 
Act by necessary implication. Section 6(6) was therefore a valid provision under 
which McCawley could be legally appointed.213 
 
206 Constitution Act ss 15–17; Supreme Court Act ss 16–17. See Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304,  
1311–15 (Griffith CJ), 1317 (Barton J), 1327–8 (O’Connor J); Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 93 
(Cooper CJ); McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 21–5 (Griffith CJ), 37 (Barton J). 
207 Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1318 (Barton J); Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 94 (Cooper CJ); 
McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 21–2 (Griffith CJ), 38 (Barton J). 
208 Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1315 (Griffith CJ), 1317–18 (Barton J). 
209 Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 97 (Cooper CJ); McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 25, 27 
(Griffith CJ), 28, 37 (Barton J), 86 (Powers J). 
210 Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 97 (Cooper CJ); McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 53–4, 
61 (Isaacs and Rich JJ), 72–3 (Higgins J); McCawley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 106, 121, 123 
(Lord Birkenhead LC). 
211 Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 97–8 (Cooper CJ), referring to Real J’s dissent; McCawley v The 
King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 52, 54 (Isaacs and Rich JJ), 73 (Higgins J), 83–4 (Powers J); McCaw-
ley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 106, 115–16, 125 (Lord Birkenhead LC). 
212 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 63 (Isaacs and Rich JJ). 
213 Ibid 67 (Isaacs and Rich JJ), 75 (Higgins J); McCawley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 106, 125 
(Lord Birkenhead LC). 
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Couched in this way, the reasoning on both sides was founded upon a shared 
premise: that the relevant powers of the Queensland Parliament, as well as any 
limits on those powers, derived entirely from Imperial sources and were subject 
to principles derived from Imperial law. On the one side, the principle of 
repugnancy and the paramount force of Imperial laws was used to elevate the 
provisions of the Constitution Act relating to judicial tenure and salaries to the 
status of higher law. On the other side, the undoubted capacity of the Queensland 
Parliament to legislate with respect to the Constitution of Queensland together 
with the lex posteriori derogat lex anteriori principle was used to affirm the 
capacity of the Parliament to legislate inconsistently with those provisions. 
While the relevant legal texts thus seemed to be capable of sustaining the 
interpretation adopted by either side, the strength of the arguments depended 
upon greater emphasis being given to the particular provisions and principles 
which happened to support each line of reasoning. It was thus quite possible for 
each side to alter their focus in order to point to anomalies which undermined the 
other’s argument. For example, Isaacs and Rich JJ and Lord Birkenhead LC were 
able to draw attention to the legislative history of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 
to support the conclusion that s 5 was intended to put to rest the kind of argu-
ment being made by the other side. 214  However, Griffith CJ, Barton and 
O’Connor JJ could just as easily point to the later enactment of the Common-
wealth Constitution, s 106 of which gave the state Constitutions the force of an 
Imperial statute.215 Neither side could claim, therefore, that the relevant texts 
unequivocally dictated a particular result. It was necessary to appeal to wider 
considerations and principles. 
B  Constitutional Theory 
Legal and constitutional theory, or what the judges referred to as ‘jurispru-
dence’216 and the opinions of ‘text-writers’,217 played a considerable role in the 
judgments on both sides. In the course of his Honour’s judgment in Cooper, 
Griffith CJ drew attention to the distinction between ‘fundamental’ and ‘ordi-
nary’ laws, which, while known to ‘jurisprudence’ and perfectly familiar to those 
governed by a written Constitution, was unlikely to be familiar to English 
lawyers because no such distinction is drawn in the English Constitution: 
Parliament is ‘supreme’ and can make any laws it thinks fit.218 While the point 
made was mainly analytical, it was cast in terms that implied a certain dispar-
agement of English lawyers, together with their principle of legislative suprem-
acy. 
 
214 See, eg, McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 48–51 (Isaacs and Rich JJ); see also McCaw-
ley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 106, 120–2 (Lord Birkenhead LC). 
215 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 22 (Griffith CJ), 33 (Barton J); Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 
1304, 1327–8 (O’Connor J). Section 106 clearly affirmed that both the Commonwealth and the 
states possessed ‘Constitutions’ — without any explicit suggestion, at least, that state Constitu-
tions were somehow less ‘fundamental’ than the Commonwealth Constitution. 
216 See, eg, Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1313 (Griffith CJ). 
217 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 28 (Barton J); McCawley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 
106, 114–15 (Lord Birkenhead LC). 
218 Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1313–15. 
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Lord Birkenhead LC, as if deliberately wishing to show that an English lawyer 
need not be as ignorant as Griffith CJ seemed to suggest, was at pains to 
demonstrate his familiarity with the analyses of ‘writers upon the subject of 
Constitutional Law’ on the difference between what his Lordship called ‘con-
trolled’ and ‘uncontrolled’ Constitutions. 219  In so doing, his Lordship may 
possibly have wished to distance himself from the relatively simplistic and 
wooden proposition that had been adopted by the Privy Council in 
Webb v Outtrim:220 that in Australia, in contrast to the United States, there was 
no such thing as judicial review, in the sense of courts having jurisdiction to 
declare statutes constitutionally invalid. 221  In a strongly worded response to 
Webb v Outtrim, Griffith CJ replied in Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation 
(NSW)222 that, while of course no ‘disrespect’ was implied, the Privy Council’s 
analysis of the Australian Constitutions could be likened to an attempt by an 
‘astral intelligence’ to interpret those instruments with the assistance of a 
‘dictionary’!223 Privy Councillors, his Honour said, would not necessarily be 
‘familiar with the history or conditions of the remoter portions of the Empire’, 
nor have ‘any sympathetic understanding of the aspirations of the younger 
communities’. 224  In the context of the issues raised in Webb v Outtrim and 
Baxter, those aspirations included very specific theories about federalism, 
constitutionalism and judicial review. 225  Lord Birkenhead LC’s opinion in 
McCawley v The King seems to have been deliberately calculated to avoid any 
suggestion that his approach was somehow rigidly technical and without an 
appreciation for the relevant theoretical and political background.226 
1 Fundamental Law 
The idea that the Constitution of Queensland amounted to a kind of fundamen-
tal or organic law was particularly prominent in the judgments of Griffith CJ, 
Barton and O’Connor JJ in Cooper and McCawley v The King.227 According to 
their Honours, the Constitution Act both defined and limited the powers of the 
Queensland Parliament such that state legislation would be valid only insofar as 
it conformed to the authority conferred by the Constitution of Queensland.228 In 
 
219 McCawley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 106, 114–15. See generally McCawley v The King (1918) 
26 CLR 9, 51–2 (Isaacs and Rich JJ). 
220 (1906) 4 CLR 356. 
221 Ibid 359 (Earl of Halsbury). To be sure, the Privy Council acknowledged that a state law which 
was repugnant to an Imperial statute extending to the colony would be inoperative to the extent 
of the repugnancy, but denied that this would amount to a declaration that the statute was ‘un-
constitutional’. 
222 (1907) 4 CLR 1087 (‘Baxter’). 
223 Ibid 1106, 1109, 1111. 
224 Ibid 1112. 
225 Nicholas Aroney, ‘The Griffith Doctrine: Reservation and Immunity’ in Michael White and 
Aladin Rahemtula (eds), Queensland Judges on the High Court (2003) 219. 
226 On Lord Birkenhead’s judgments as Lord Chancellor, including in McCawley v The King (1920) 
28 CLR 106, see John Campbell, F E Smith, First Earl of Birkenhead (1983) 486–97. 
227 See Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1313–14 (Griffith CJ), 1317–18 (Barton J), 1326–9 
(O’Connor J); McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 28, 31–3 (Barton J). 
228 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 24–5 (Griffith CJ), 37–9 (Barton J). 
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appealing to the concept of fundamental law, the judges invoked a principle of 
much wider application than the legal rule that Imperial statutes have paramount 
force. The concept of a fundamental or organic law can be discerned in a wide 
range of institutions, private and public, ranging from the constitution of a 
company, to the Constitution of an independent nation-state. For that reason, 
arguments derived from case law relating to the internal affairs of joint stock 
companies229 were deemed to be as relevant to the issues in McCawley’s Case as 
the principles of constitutional law contained in statutes such as the Colonial 
Laws Validity Act and the Commonwealth Constitution.230 
While there were no general philosophical arguments made in favour of a 
political system of this kind, the judges who supported the fundamental law 
argument certainly seem to have favoured such a system on wider theoretical 
grounds. Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ clearly felt the question to be one 
of ‘great and general importance’231 and insisted that if Queensland were to have 
a ‘genuine Constitution’ it must be in the nature of a fundamental law.232 While 
their Honours could not deny that the Queensland Parliament was ‘supreme’ — 
in the sense that it had full power to amend the Constitution of Queensland — 
they concluded that the Constitution must first be altered by an explicit and 
deliberate amendment before otherwise inconsistent ordinary legislation could be 
validly enacted.233 Griffith CJ provided a principled reason for this conclusion 
when his Honour argued that requiring a formal constitutional amendment would 
ensure that the general political and legal significance of any proposed constitu-
tional change received the careful attention it deserved within the legislature and 
among the voting public.234 
Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ, as well as the judges of the Supreme 
Court, also emphasised the practical and political importance of securing the 
independence of the judiciary by constitutionally protecting the tenure and 
salaries of judges.235 Cooper CJ said that judicial independence was one of the 
‘cherished characteristics of the system under which justice is administered 
throughout our Empire’.236 Griffith CJ called it a ‘great constitutional princi-
ple’.237 O’Connor J had further suggested that judicial independence existed in 
order to ‘better secur[e] the rights and liberties of the subject’.238 Of course, as 
Isaacs and Rich JJ pointed out, to understand the principle to be entrenched as a 
matter of fundamental law was to go further than had occurred even in the 
 
229 Ibid 22–4 (Griffith CJ), 35–7 (Barton J). 
230 Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1313 (Griffith CJ); McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 21–2 
(Griffith CJ), 33 (Barton J), relying on Commonwealth Constitution s 106. 
231 See Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1311 (Griffith CJ), 1317–18 (Barton J), 1326 (O’Connor J). 
232 Ibid 1313 (Griffith CJ), 1328 (O’Connor J); McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 24–5 
(Griffith CJ), 32 (Barton J), 82–3 (Powers J). Barton J thought the absence of a fundamental law 
to be a kind of ‘deprivation’: at 32. 
233 Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1311–15 (Griffith CJ), 1317 (Barton J), 1327–8 (O’Connor J). 
234 Ibid 1315. 
235 See ibid 1318–19 (Barton J), 1324 (O’Connor J); Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 68 (Cooper CJ); 
McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 22 (Griffith CJ). 
236 Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 68. 
237 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 22. 
238 Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1324. 
     
638 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 30 
 
     
United Kingdom, where the Act of Settlement and subsequent legislation 
certainly bound the Crown but did not bind the British Parliament. 239  But 
Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ, as well as Cooper CJ and the other 
members of the Supreme Court majority, were determined to treat the Constitu-
tion of Queensland as a kind of fundamental law which bound not only the 
government, but also the legislature. In support of this conclusion, Barton J had 
observed in Cooper that the British Parliament had never attacked the independ-
ence of the judiciary and would not even dream of doing so. 240  Similarly, 
Cooper CJ suggested that no ‘self-respecting Legislature’ would willingly confer 
upon the executive such ‘extensive powers’ as would enable it to undermine the 
independence of the courts.241 Certainly, these observations were expressed as 
matters of positive political morality, rather than binding constitutional law. But 
the mere fact that these judges were prepared to conclude that the protection of 
judicial tenure was a matter of fundamental law shows that the idea of what a 
‘self-respecting Legislature’ ought to refrain from doing supported a particular 
conception about what it must, as a matter of law, refrain from doing. For these 
judges, the ought of normative constitutional theory underlay the is of positive 
constitutional law. 
While the judgments were silent on this point, the conclusion that the Constitu-
tion of Queensland was a kind of fundamental law derived not only from the 
British concept of the paramount force of Imperial law, but also from the 
American constitutional tradition, in which written Constitutions function as 
‘higher law’ and the courts have jurisdiction to ensure that legislation conforms 
to it.242 Griffith CJ and Barton J had favoured many aspects of the American 
approach to constitutionalism during the debate over the Commonwealth 
Constitution in the 1890s.243  As High Court judges, their Honours had also 
incorporated American principles into their interpretation of the Commonwealth 
Constitution, particularly in the development of the implied immunities and state 
reserved powers doctrines.244 In McCawley’s Case, their Honours applied the 
same general principles, as far as they could, to the Constitution Act. 
 
239 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 58–60. 
240 (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1319. 
241 Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 82, where the majority avoided an interpretation of the Industrial 
Arbitration Act which would have enabled the Labor Government to ‘pack’ the Supreme Court 
with an unlimited number of judges. Cf the joint judgment in the Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 
CLR 129, 151, where Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ argued that the possibility of an 
‘abuse’ of power is no reason in the common law for limiting the legal powers of Parliament. 
242 See, eg, Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
243 See, eg, Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 6 March 
1891, 91–5 (Edmund Barton); Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, 
Sydney, 18 March 1891, 489–91 (Sir Samuel Griffith). 
244 See, eg, D’Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91; Deakin v Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585; Federated 
Amalgamated Government Railway and Tramway Service Association v New South Wales Rail-
way Traffic Employees Association (1906) 4 CLR 488; Baxter (1907) 4 CLR 1087; R v Barger 
(1908) 6 CLR 41; A-G (NSW) ex rel Tooth v Brewery Employees Union of New South Wales 
(1908) 6 CLR 469; Huddart Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330. 
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2 Parliamentary Sovereignty 
Against the argument of fundamental law, Lord Birkenhead LC, as well as 
Isaacs, Rich and Higgins JJ, were quite prepared to embrace the alternative 
maxim of parliamentary sovereignty.245 According to these judges, there could 
be no middle ground: the Constitution Act was either fundamental law or an 
ordinary statute; it was either ‘controlled’ or it was not.246 Since the Queensland 
Parliament undoubtedly had power to alter the Constitution of Queensland in any 
manner which it thought fit, they concluded that the Constitution Act could not 
be a fundamental law and, as a corollary, the Queensland Parliament was in the 
position of a quasi-sovereign legislature within its territory. 
Admittedly, this commitment to parliamentary sovereignty was most evident in 
the judgment of Isaacs and Rich JJ. In Cooper, Higgins J altogether avoided 
what his Honour called the many ‘curious and delicate points’ raised by the 
arguments about fundamental law and parliamentary sovereignty, deciding the 
case on the narrow legal ground of statutory interpretation.247 When in McCaw-
ley’s Case it became impossible for his Honour to avoid the issue, Higgins J’s 
judgment, as well as the opinion delivered by Lord Birkenhead LC for the Privy 
Council, focused almost entirely on the relevant constitutional provisions and 
their interpretation, understood in technical legal terms.248 
By contrast, Isaacs and Rich JJ seemed to favour the case for parliamentary 
sovereignty, not only as a matter of law, but also as a matter of normative 
constitutional theory. For example, when their Honours explicitly adopted A V 
Dicey’s description of the Colonial Laws Validity Act as a ‘charter of colonial 
legislative independence’,249 they must have been aware that this would associ-
ate the powers granted to the colonial legislatures with Dicey’s famous thesis 
concerning the sovereignty of the British Parliament. Thus, the question in issue, 
their Honours said, was whether the ‘Parliaments of Queensland and the other 
States of this Commonwealth have powers of the noble character broadly framed 
by the Parliament of the Empire’,250 or whether their powers ‘are still open to the 
embarrassing doubts and technical impediments that according to some opinions 
fettered the legislative action of a colony over half a century ago’. 251  The 
question, in other words, was whether the Constitution of Queensland ‘affords … 
ample means for translating the public will into public law’. 252  To impose 
constitutional constraints upon the Queensland Parliament was a kind of depriva-
tion — the abdication of a power conferred ‘for the benefit of the commu-
 
245 It may be worth noting that while Lord Birkenhead LC positively embraced the combination of 
executive, legislative and judicial functions embodied in his office as Lord Chancellor, his Lord-
ship at times actively intervened to protect the independence of the judiciary from executive 
interference: Campbell, above n 226, 467–8, 479–81. 
246 See especially McCawley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 106, 114–17 (Lord Birkenhead LC). 
247 See especially Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1331. 
248 See, eg, McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 72–6 (Higgins J); see also McCawley v The 
King (1920) 28 CLR 106, 117–28 (Lord Birkenhead LC). 
249 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 44, citing A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the 
Law of the Constitution (8th ed, 1915) 101. 
250 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 44. 
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nity’.253 All of these considerations pointed to the preferability, in their Honours’ 
view, of a political system in which the legislature is sovereign. 
Reflecting, then, upon the approach the courts should take to such questions, 
Isaacs and Rich JJ cited the opinion of Lord Selborne in R v Burah254 to the 
effect that ‘it is not for any Court of justice … to enlarge constructively’ the 
‘conditions and restrictions’ which might be imposed upon a colonial legislature 
by the terms of an Imperial grant.255 Of course, it was in R v Burah that the Privy 
Council had described the Indian Parliament as being in possession of ‘plenary 
powers of legislation, as large, and of the same nature, as those of [the Imperial] 
Parliament itself’.256 While Higgins J did not cite R v Burah, his Honour agreed 
that the courts had ‘no right to give a meaning to the words of the Constitution 
which the words do not bear in themselves’,257 even if that is to secure a worthy 
constitutional goal, such as the protection of judicial independence. Such 
questions were ‘a matter for the framers of the Constitution.’258 
In effect, Higgins J appears to have been just about as supportive of the princi-
ple of parliamentary sovereignty as were Isaacs and Rich JJ. Like them, Hig-
gins J had exhibited a certain aversion to the various American constitutional 
principles that had been adopted by Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ in their 
interpretation of the Commonwealth Constitution, and his Honour had displayed 
a general preference for the principles enunciated by the Privy Council concern-
ing the constitutional status of the British colonies.259 All of this, of course, 
foreshadowed the decision that would be made in the landmark Engineers’ 
Case,260 in which Isaacs and Rich JJ would soon join and Higgins J concur. Just 
as the decisions of Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ on state constitutional 
law need to be read with their decisions on the Commonwealth Constitution,261 
 
253 Ibid 57. 
254 (1873) 3 App Cas 889. 
255 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 64–5, citing R v Burah (1873) 3 App Cas 889, 905 
(Lord Selbourne). 
256 (1873) 3 App Cas 889, 904 (Lord Selborne). Cf Hodge v The Queen (1883) 9 App Cas 117, 132, 
where Lord Fitzgerald described the powers conferred upon the Ontario legislature to be ‘as 
plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed … as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude 
of its power possessed and could bestow. Within these limits … the local legislature is supreme’. 
See also Powell v Apollo Candle Co (1883) 10 App Cas 282, applying these principles to the 
legislature of New South Wales. 
257 Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1333. 
258 Ibid. 
259 For example, Higgins J specifically ruled out the applicability of the decision of the High Court 
in Deakin v Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585, a case in which the High Court had adopted the ‘Ameri-
can’ approach to federal constitutionalism. In so doing, his Honour cast considerable doubt upon 
Deakin v Webb, referring instead to the Privy Council’s response in Webb v Outtrim (1906) 4 
CLR 356, which had rejected the position taken by the High Court (and was the object of Grif-
fith CJ’s criticism in Baxter (1907) 4 CLR 1087). See also Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1330 
(Higgins J), citing Deakin v Webb and Webb v Outtrim. Isaacs and Rich JJ likewise cited 
Webb v Outtrim and repeatedly suggested that the fundamental law argument amounted to a kind 
of ‘implied prohibition’ which lacked any textual foundation (by way of an explicit ‘negative 
provision’) in the Constitution of Queensland: see McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 57, 
60, 64–5 (Isaacs and Rich JJ). 
260 (1920) 28 CLR 129. 
261 See, eg, above n 244 and accompanying text. 
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so must the decisions of Isaacs, Rich and Higgins JJ on the state Constitutions be 
read with their approach to federal constitutional law.262 The same goes for the 
Privy Council, whose decision in Webb v Outtrim clearly foreshadowed the 
position it took in McCawley’s Case.263 
When delivering the opinion of the Privy Council, Lord Birkenhead LC sought 
to acknowledge at least some of the considerations which might lead a particular 
political community to favour the American approach of treating the Constitution 
as a kind of fundamental law.264 However, his Lordship explained that the British 
people had 
not in the framing of Constitutions felt it necessary, or thought it useful, to 
shackle the complete independence of their successors. They have shrunk from 
the assumption that a degree of wisdom and foresight has been conceded to 
their generation which will be, or may be, wanting to their successors, in spite 
of the fact that those successors will possess more experience of the circum-
stances and necessities amid which their lives are lived.265 
For this reason, his Lordship continued, the Imperial Parliament had deliber-
ately chosen not to ‘shackle or control’ the legislative powers conferred upon the 
‘nascent’ Australian legislatures.266 Complete legislative powers were conferred 
in the ‘fully justified’ belief that ‘these young communities would successfully 
work out their own constitutional salvation’.267 The Queensland Parliament, his 
Lordship concluded, is — and seemingly should be — the ‘master of its own 
household’.268 
The question, then, for Lord Birkenhead LC, as well as for Isaacs, Rich and 
Higgins JJ, was whether the Queensland legislature would have sufficient power 
to govern the community, ‘unshackled’ by constraints imposed by a Constitution 
which is enforced by the judiciary as a kind of fundamental law. Their concern 
seems to have been to ensure that the legislature, deciding by ordinary majority, 
would be free to legislate as it thought fit and, more particularly, possess a 
‘sufficiently elastic constitutional means of amendment’ to ensure that the 
Constitution of Queensland could be kept up to date with the ever-changing 
requirements of the Queensland community.269 A commitment to majoritarian 
legislative supremacy was fundamental to this objective. 
 
262 For example, the judgments of Isaacs, Rich and Higgins JJ in McCawley v The King (1918) 26 
CLR 9 should be read with the submissions of Isaacs (as King’s Counsel) in Deakin v Webb 
(1904) 1 CLR 585, 596–7, and with their Honours’ judgments in the Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 
CLR 129. 
263 See Webb v Outtrim (1906) 4 CLR 356, 359 (Earl of Halsbury). 
264 The considerations were put, however, in rather feeble terms: the framers of such Constitutions, 
his Lordship said, ‘must be supposed to have believed that certainty and stability were … the 
supreme desiderata’: see McCawley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 106, 115. 
265 Ibid 114–15. 
266 Ibid 117. 
267 Ibid. 
268 Ibid 125. 
269 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 64 (Isaacs and Rich JJ). It is in this sense, it seems, that 
Isaacs J referred in Taylor (1917) 23 CLR 457, 474, to the necessary capacity of a 
‘self-governing community’ to determine what combination of institutions would be ‘sufficient 
as its organ of legislation’. 
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3 Limits of Constitutional Theory 
If constitutional theory was an essential part of the reasoning on both sides, 
there was at the same time a distinct limit to the extent to which each theoretical 
framework provided a coherent theoretical foundation for their respective 
conclusions. 
Lord Birkenhead LC, Isaacs, Rich and Higgins JJ sought to ground the plenary 
powers of the Queensland Parliament in a series of Imperial statutes — in 
particular, Colonial Laws Validity Act s 5. But in so doing, they could not 
dispense altogether with the idea of fundamental law, at least in the form of 
Imperial law operating in Queensland by paramount force. It was undeniable that 
the powers, not only of the Commonwealth Parliament, but also of the Parlia-
ments of the Australian states, were limited by Imperial statutes and that the 
courts certainly had jurisdiction to declare colonial legislation invalid on the 
ground of repugnancy. 
The recognition of the existence of fundamental law in this sense was most 
clearly articulated by Isaacs J in his judgment in Taylor. As discussed, Isaacs J 
accepted that the power conferred by Colonial Laws Validity Act s 5 was subject 
to a number of important ‘fundamental’ constraints: in particular, the ‘representa-
tive’ character of the Parliament, the ‘fundamental conception’ of the Crown and 
the original power contained in cl 22 of the Order in Council.270 As Barton J 
later pointed out, Isaacs J had regarded the idea that the Parliament had power to 
amend or repeal cl 22 as ‘unthinkable’.271 Although in McCawley’s Case, Isaacs 
and Rich JJ skirted the issue, Higgins J was also prepared to affirm the idea that 
cl 22 was in this sense ‘fundamental’.272 The conclusion that these aspects of the 
Constitution of Queensland were fundamental was not, however, explicitly 
required by the provisions of the relevant Imperial instruments. Such a view 
turned upon the highly contested theoretical question of whether the rule by 
which sovereign (or sovereign-like) power is conferred upon a particular 
legislature is itself within the legal competence of that legislature. 273  When 
examined closely, the conclusion that the representative character of the legisla-
ture must be maintained likewise rested upon an interpretation of Colonial Laws 
Validity Act s 5 which was supported by the conviction that such legislatures 
should remain democratic.274 Similarly, the insistence on the indispensability of 
the Crown showed that Isaacs J was prepared to postulate certain fundamentals 
based on a conception of what the Constitution ought to be.275 
 
270 Taylor (1917) 23 CLR 457, 474–6, citing Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1314 (Griffith CJ). 
271 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 39, citing Taylor (1917) 23 CLR 457, 476 (Isaacs J). 
272 See McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 60–2 (Isaacs and Rich JJ), 75 (Higgins J), citing 
Cooper (1907) 4 CLR 1304, 1314 (Griffith CJ). 
273 See, eg, H W R Wade, ‘The Basis of Legal Sovereignty’ [1955] Cambridge Law Journal 172; 
Sir W Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (5th ed, 1959) ch 4; Geoffrey Marshall, Con-
stitutional Theory (1971) ch 3; Paul Craig, ‘Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament 
After Factortame’ (1991) 11 Yearbook of European Law 221. 
274 See Taylor (1917) 23 CLR 457, 468 (Barton J), 474 (Isaacs J), 477 (Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ). 
See also above n 190 and accompanying text. 
275 Cf the role which the ubiquity of the Crown played in the joint judgment in the Engineers’ Case 
(1920) 28 CLR 129, 152–4 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). 
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If the difficulty for Isaacs J was to explain how these aspects of the Constitu-
tion of Queensland were fundamental when the independence of the judiciary 
was not, the difficulty for Griffith CJ was to show precisely how the fundamen-
tal aspects of the Constitution of Queensland could be distinguished from the 
ordinary aspects of the statutory law of Queensland. Apart from being contained 
within a Queensland statute which was labelled ‘constitutional’, there was no 
formal set of criteria by which constitutional and ordinary provisions within that 
statute might be distinguished. As Isaacs, Rich and Higgins JJ argued, there was 
nothing ‘magical’ in the mere label ‘Constitution’, even when affixed to the short 
title of a particular enactment.276 Indeed, parts of the Constitution of Queensland 
were contained in statutes that were not labelled as ‘constitutional’,277 and there 
was no single document which could be identified as Queensland’s ‘written 
Constitution’.278 The problem, therefore, was how the Constitution of Queen-
sland could be a kind of ‘fundamental law’ despite the fact that it was contained 
in an ordinary statute susceptible to amendment by ordinary enactment. As Lord 
Birkenhead LC put it, a polity having both sets of characteristics would be 
‘unique in constitutional history’.279 In a ‘genuinely controlled Constitution’, his 
Lordship pointed out, it is possible to point to ‘specific articles in the legislative 
instruments or instruments which created the Constitution, prescribing with 
meticulous precision the methods by which, and by which alone, it could be 
altered.’ 280  The absence of any such ‘special formality’ in the case of the 
Constitution of Queensland — its liability to be amended by ordinary statute — 
meant that the respondents had been driven into ‘dialectical difficulties which 
are embarrassing and even ridiculous.’281 
There was a definite limit, therefore, to the claim that Queensland possessed a 
written Constitution which operated as a kind of fundamental law. Ultimately, 
the argument rested not upon the derivation of the Constitution of Queensland 
from ‘the people of Queensland’ or upon some other autochthonous constituent 
authority, but rather upon its derivation from the Imperial Parliament. This 
removed one of the leading rationales for the existence of a fundamental law. 
Written Constitutions that are in nature fundamental laws are usually enacted 
(and amended) through some special process or institution (for example, a 
constituent assembly, specially elected convention, referendum or special 
majority voting rule) which is distinct from the ordinary legislative procedure 
(for example, a simple majority of both Houses of the legislature). It is a 
commonplace assumption that the distinction between fundamental and ordinary 
law is founded upon the difference between the two procedures — one ‘constitu-
 
276 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 47, 52 (Isaacs and Rich JJ), 73 (Higgins J). Isaacs and 
Rich JJ maintained that Queensland only had a ‘Constitution’ in the sense of a law which defines 
the composition and powers of the various institutions of government: at 52. 
277 See, eg, Supreme Court Act. 
278 See McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 51–2 (Isaacs and Rich JJ). Cf Cooper (1907) 4 
CLR 1304, 1314 (Griffith CJ). See also A-G (NSW) v Ray (1989) 90 ALR 263, 277 (Young J); 
Stuart-Robinson v Lloyd (1932) 47 CLR 482, 491 (Evatt J). 
279 McCawley v The King (1920) 28 CLR 106, 117. 
280 Ibid 116. 
281 Ibid 114, 116 (Lord Birkenhead LC). His Lordship also characterised their submissions as 
‘neither clearly conceived, nor intelligibly described’: at 124. 
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tive’ and the other ‘legislative’ — and the idea that a special ‘constituent’ power 
is responsible for the fundamental law of the Constitution, whereas the ‘consti-
tuted’ power of the ordinary legislature itself derives from this prior, constitutive 
act. But since the Queensland Parliament clearly had power to legislate to amend 
both the Order in Council and the Constitution Act by ordinary statute, there 
were no formal criteria that could be used to distinguish ordinary from funda-
mental or constitutional enactments. 
C  Political Dimensions 
Why, then, did the judges adopt the positions they did in McCawley’s Case? If 
constitutional theory took them only part of the way, in what sense, and to what 
degree, were they influenced by wider political conceptions of the province and 
task of the public institutions of government? To what degree were they influ-
enced by the specific policies of the Labor Government and thus of partisan, 
political and even personal motives? 
1 Personalities, Partisanship and Ideology 
A majority of the judges of the Supreme Court certainly appear to have dis-
agreed with many of the policies adopted by the Labor Government. Cooper CJ 
clearly believed there had been no increase in the work of the Court that necessi-
tated the appointment of additional Justices. 282  Well aware of the fact that 
McCawley had not worked as a barrister in private practice, his Honour said that 
a ‘stricter qualification’ would have been preferable — that ‘actual practice in 
the legal profession’, rather than mere admission, is necessary in order to ‘equip’ 
a judge for the ‘competent performance of the important and multifarious duties 
which he will be called upon to discharge’.283 Even though these comments were 
directed to the legislation and not to the appointment of McCawley in particular, 
they cast rather obvious aspersions on McCawley’s competence and qualifica-
tions. It is little wonder that McCawley’s personal response to the judgment was 
to characterise it as ‘strained’, ‘offensive’ and ‘little short of ridiculous’. 284 
McCawley also observed that the ‘atmosphere of hostility’ at a ‘political, 
professional and personal’ level made an adverse result highly predictable.285 
Underlying the Supreme Court’s conclusions, however, was a particular view 
of the proper relationship between the Parliament, the executive government, the 
Supreme Court and the Constitution of Queensland.286 The Court was concerned 
that the legislature had ‘surrendered to the Executive Government power to pack 
the Supreme Court Bench with any number of Judges which the Executive 
Government may think fit to appoint’ and ‘to increase indefinitely the charges 
 
282 See Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 65. 
283 Ibid 99. 
284 ‘Reasons for Judgment with Notes by Mr McCawley’ in Brief for Appellant, McCawley v The 
King (High Court of Australia) 37, 46 (Queensland State Archives, Archive No CRS/206). 
285 Letter from McCawley to Higgins, 2 February 1918, above n 1. 
286 For a similar analysis, see McPherson, above n 4, 288, who observes that although Cooper CJ 
was ‘unsympathetic’ to Labor Party policies, his ‘more fundamental’ motive was one of ‘con-
strain[ing] the growth of Executive power irrespective of the party exercising it.’ 
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imposed on the revenues of the State’.287 If the Government were given an 
unfettered discretion to commit state revenues to the salaries of additional judges 
so appointed, the capacity of the Parliament to control Government expenditure 
would be compromised. Moreover, if the government were able to ‘flood’ or 
‘pack’ the Court in this way, the capacity of the Court to act as an independent 
check upon the executive power would be severely compromised. A ‘less 
comprehensive’ and a ‘more comprehensible’ interpretation of the legislature’s 
intention — so as to avoid ‘unthinkable’ consequences such as these — was 
therefore preferable.288 
However, the political ideology of the Labor Government suggested a concep-
tion of the law and the courts in which law can and should be an instrument of 
social reform, so long as the power to make, administer and adjudicate upon the 
law is held by those possessing the ‘appropriate’ knowledge, experience and 
goodwill.289 On this view, the constitutional discipline and restraint imposed by 
judicial review of legislation might in fact hinder, rather than facilitate, desirable 
social change. In argument before the Supreme Court, Ryan (who was both 
Premier and Attorney-General at the time) submitted that in this case artificial 
constitutional constraints on political power were not necessary because ‘no 
self-respecting Government would be likely to abuse these extensive powers’.290 
Thus, Ryan was not altogether opposed to the separation of powers. 291  He 
certainly thought that the courts should not interfere with matters which were 
properly the concern of Parliament and the executive government: ‘whether the 
Act should be upon the Statute Book is a matter for Parliament. Whether the 
Executive should appoint another Judge is a matter for the Executive; it is not a 
matter for this Bench.’292 
The Supreme Court, however, rejected Ryan’s arguments and, by implication, 
the premises upon which they were based. It replied that ‘no self-respecting 
Legislature would be willing to confer such powers upon the Executive Gov-
ernment’. 293  Implicit in this reply was the proposition that constitutional 
constraints on governmental power are designed to prevent an abuse of power, in 
particular by the executive government. In concluding that the Constitution of 
Queensland could only be amended or repealed by a deliberate and explicit 
 
287 Re McCawley [1918] QSR 62, 82 (Cooper CJ). Remarkably, the Court wrote as if it were Ryan’s 
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enactment to that effect, the Court determinedly imposed a constitutional 
constraint upon a legislature which had been gripped, it thought, by ‘an almost 
feverish anxiety’.294 
Reflecting, perhaps, on some of the more intemperate observations of the 
Supreme Court, Isaacs and Rich JJ in the High Court asserted that a judge must 
not assume that anything ‘absurd or unjust’ is intended by the legislature, and 
that a judge certainly has no right to ‘brand as absurd or unjust any policy which 
he personally might not approve.’295 However, this did not prevent members of 
the High Court from making a number of observations of a noticeably personal 
and partisan nature. Like Cooper CJ before him, Griffith CJ doubted, for 
example, whether McCawley possessed the necessary qualifications for ap-
pointment as a judge, characterising McCawley as a ‘mere clerk’.296 Likewise, 
during argument, Barton and Gavan Duffy JJ described the Queensland Arbitra-
tion Court deprecatingly as a kind of ‘drafting area’297 and a ‘sort of incuba-
tor’,298 for prospective Supreme Court appointees. By contrast, Higgins J clearly 
thought that there was good reason for appointment of judges from the Queen-
sland Arbitration Court to the Supreme Court299 and, notably, his Honour alone 
concluded that McCawley’s appointment to the Supreme Court was not limited 
to that time during which he continued to hold office as a judge or President of 
the Queensland Arbitration Court. 300  Higgins J’s personal, professional and 
ideological sympathy for McCawley’s position is understandable, given that his 
Honour held the equivalent federal positions of both President of the Queensland 
Arbitration Court and High Court judge. However, his Honour’s private corre-
spondence with McCawley over these very matters casts a rather dark shadow 
over his willingness to sit and hear the case.301 
In this context, Ryan, Theodore and McCawley could certainly be forgiven for 
thinking that the ‘constitutional’ opposition that they encountered in the courts 
was, at base, politically motivated.302 Just as clearly, however, their opponents 
could point to the way in which the theory of parliamentary sovereignty favoured 
 
294 Ibid. 
295 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 45. 
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September 1918) (Queensland State Archives, Archive No CRS/207, 310). 
299 Ibid (Higgins J, 10 September 1918) (Queensland State Archives, Archive No CRS/207, 320). 
300 McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 69–72. 
301 See Letter from McCawley to Higgins, 2 February 1918, above n 1. 
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by Isaacs, Rich and Higgins JJ facilitated the political objectives of the Labor 
Government. What, then, of the supposed neutrality of the Constitution of 
Queensland as embodying the fundamental ground rules upon which all sides of 
politics might agree? In rejecting revolutionary methods, the Fabians had 
certainly embraced the potential of parliamentary and legal methods to achieve 
social justice objectives. But this did not mean an acceptance of the constitu-
tional status quo. Instead, it meant reform of a wide range of constitutional 
fundamentals, such as the electoral system and the Legislative Council. In 
McCawley’s Case, it also meant a rejection of the ‘fundamental law’ theory that 
had been advanced by Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ. 
It would not have been an easy matter, however, for the Labor Government to 
initiate an amendment to the Constitution Act separately and prior to the passage 
of the Industrial Arbitration Act. Passage of the latter Act had proved difficult 
enough, particularly given the determined opposition of the Legislative Council. 
Yet, as Griffith CJ suggested, a deliberate and explicit alteration to the Constitu-
tion Act would have brought the issues of constitutional principle to the forefront 
of public and parliamentary debate. A debate of this kind would have enabled 
opponents to argue, with some force, that the constitutional protection of the 
independence of the judiciary was very much at stake. The terms of debate could 
thus have become more clearly constitutional in character, abstracted from the 
immediate implications for partisan politics.  
2 Politico-Constitutional Theory 
It is tolerably clear, then, that the legal conclusions adopted by the judges 
tended to correspond generally to their respective personal, partisan and ideo-
logical commitments. Indeed, while the decision of the Privy Council was free of 
any explicit suggestion of a ‘political’ interest in the outcome, it could be said 
that Lord Birkenhead LC’s sympathy for moderate social reform within the 
frame of Conservative Party politics303 was at least compatible with the conclu-
sion that the Parliament of Queensland should be ‘master of its own house-
hold’. 304  But can the reasoning of the judges be reduced to expressions of 
personal preference, partisan commitment and ideological bias? What was the 
basis for the decision? 
While a definitive answer to this question will probably remain elusive, it 
seems to be at least arguable that the critical ground of the decision was neither 
purely legal, nor reductively political, but lay somewhere between these two 
poles — at the point of contact, as it were, between fundamental constitutional 
theory on one hand and fundamental political philosophy on the other. In other 
words, the case was ultimately decided in terms of contrasting theories of a 
‘politico-constitutional’ nature. As Sir Owen Dixon once observed: 
An inquiry into the source whence the law derives its authority in a community, 
if prosecuted too far, becomes merely metaphysical. But if a theoretical answer 
be adopted by a system of law as part of its principles, it will not remain a mere 
 
303 On Lord Birkenhead’s interest in social reform as a kind of ‘progressive Tory’, see Campbell, 
above n 226, 527. 
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speculative explanation of juristic facts. It will possess the capacity of produc-
ing rules of law.305 
The decision in McCawley’s Case to opt for either fundamental law or parlia-
mentary sovereignty seems ultimately to have turned on a conception of what 
‘constitutional law’ ought to be.306 Is it a ‘fundamental law’ that limits the power 
of the legislature, or is it, at base, merely a ‘positive law’ ultimately derived from 
the legislature? A choice between these two conceptions has to be made. And at 
this point, abstract political theory provides some important guidance. In 
politico-constitutional terms, the question can be reformulated as: should 
constitutional law be seen principally as a facilitator of social and economic 
reform, ultimately controlled and directed by a popularly elected legislature, or 
should it be conceived primarily as a means by which governmental and 
legislative power is controlled, so that a sphere of private freedom can be 
maintained? Abstract political theory — along either social democratic or liberal 
lines — can in this way provide a reason for opting for one conception of 
constitutional law over another. 
Thus, the decision seems to have turned upon competing conceptions of what 
it meant for Queensland to be a ‘self-governing community’.307 While all agreed 
that the mark of a self-governing community was that it would be fully able to 
determine the shape of its own Constitution,308 there were different views of 
what it meant for a community to possess this kind of self-constituting power. 
According to Lord Birkenhead LC, as well as Isaacs, Rich and Higgins JJ, 
constituent power is and ought to be vested in the Queensland Parliament, and 
constituent power, by its very nature, cannot be limited by constitutional law.309 
However, Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ maintained that there must be a 
constituent power lying behind the Constitution of Queensland more fundamen-
tal than the legislature, and their ultimate reason for this was, quite bluntly, that 
they favoured the conception of the Constitution as a kind of fundamental law.310 
Thus, the political question of what it meant to be a self-governing community 
returned, ultimately, to a constitutional question about the nature and location of 
constituent power. 
Almost 30 years earlier, at the Federal Convention of 1891, Griffith had him-
self articulated a conception of what that constituent power might be. During 
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body, that is able to amend its own Constitution by an ordinary statute: see Cooper (1907) 4 
CLR 1304, 1309–10 (O’Connor J). 
310 See McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 24–5 (Griffith CJ), 28, 31–3 (Barton J); see also at 
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debate over the terms of the proposed Constitution for an Australian federation, 
Griffith expressed the wish that the Australian colonies might some day adopt 
the ‘American theory’ that ‘all constitutions are the act of the individual mem-
bers of the community, and that they delegate their power to the legislature, and 
that that legislature can only work within the authority given to it.’311  It is 
significant that Griffith’s remarks were made in the context of the debate over 
what would eventually become the Commonwealth Constitution s 51(xxxviii).312 
The framers of the Commonwealth Constitution were at the time conscious that 
some provision would have to be made for the exercise, within Australia, of the 
fundamental legislative powers exercisable by the Imperial Parliament. While 
the ultimate decision on s 51(xxxviii) would be to confer upon the Common-
wealth and state Parliaments the capacity to exercise those powers, Griffith was 
acutely aware of the limitations of such a provision. Griffith acknowledged, in 
particular, that the English approach had in fact been adopted in the Australian 
colonies, for the Parliaments had power to alter their own Constitutions.313 But 
he appears to have been rather hostile to the legislative sovereignty that this 
implied, and he emphasised, at least, that in exercising their powers, the colonies 
could not go so far as to renounce their allegiance to the Crown.314 
When Griffith CJ’s judgments in Cooper and McCawley v The King are as-
sessed in this light, it appears that his Honour was striving to interpret the 
Constitution of Queensland in a manner that came as close as possible to 
embodying the ‘American’ theory of popular sovereignty. While his Honour 
could not actually assert that the people of Queensland had established the 
Constitution of Queensland by virtue of their fundamental constitutive power, 
Griffith CJ could at least conclude that they possessed a kind of fundamental law 
which bound — if only in a formal sense — the legislative powers of the 
Queensland Parliament. Moreover, it is not without significance that Griffith CJ 
described the American theory as locating ultimate constitutive authority in the 
individual members of the community. The theory of constitutionalism to which 
his Honour appealed was to this extent a liberal-individualist one — a poli-
tico-constitutional theory in which law, and particularly constitutional law, is 
essentially a means by which governmental power is strictly defined and limited. 
On the other hand, the view of parliamentary sovereignty articulated by Isaacs 
and Higgins JJ coalesced rather neatly with the reformist conception of govern-
 
311 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 18 March 1891, 490 
(Sir Samuel Griffith); see also Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, 
Sydney, 6 March 1891, 91–5 (Edmund Barton). 
312 Section 51(xxxviii) provides that the Commonwealth Parliament shall have power to make laws 
with respect to 
the exercise within the Commonwealth, at the request or with the concurrence of the Parlia-
ments of all the States directly concerned, of any power which can at the establishment of this 
Constitution be exercised only by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by the Federal 
Council of Australasia. 
See generally Nicholas Aroney, ‘Sir Samuel Griffith’s Vision of Australian Federalism’ in Mi-
chael White and Aladin Rahemtula (eds), Sir Samuel Griffith: The Law and the Constitution 
(2002) 179, 194–7. 
313 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 18 March 1891, 490 
(Sir Samuel Griffith). 
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ment which they both supported — and had articulated during the Convention 
Debates in the 1890s, often in opposition to the views of Griffith, Barton and 
others. 315  On this conception, while fundamental law in liberal-conservative 
hands is liable to function as an impediment to desirable social change, govern-
mental power when in socially progressive hands can be a very effective 
instrument of social reform. And, as Professor W G McMinn once observed, the 
approach to interpreting the Commonwealth Constitution adopted by Isaacs and 
Higgins JJ enabled the document to be treated as ‘an organism capable of growth 
and adaptation to changing forces in society, rather than a carefully regulated 
machine for the balancing of these forces’. 316  Their Honours’ decision in 
McCawley’s Case, it seems, was nothing but an outworking of essentially the 
same fundamental politico-constitutional theory in the context of the Constitu-
tion of Queensland. 
IV  CONCLUSIONS 
The appointment of McCawley to high judicial office was a decision destined 
to provoke political controversy. While the objections to his appointment were 
outwardly ‘legal’ and ‘constitutional’ in character, they were undoubtedly 
motivated by underlying ideological, partisan and even personal factors. More-
over, the ‘political’ orientations of the judges who heard the case were very 
consistent with their ultimate ‘legal’ conclusions. The radical-liberal political 
perspectives of Isaacs and Higgins JJ, for example, dovetailed neatly with their 
decision to uphold Queensland legislation setting up a Queensland Arbitration 
Court, as well as to affirm the plenary powers of the state Parliament. Further-
more, Higgins J had been appointed to a position at a federal level which 
mirrored McCawley’s own position, and also had close personal and professional 
ties with McCawley. His Honour even engaged in correspondence with McCaw-
ley concerning his appointment and the associated controversy, yet did not 
withdraw from hearing the case. 
Does this mean that the conclusions of Isaacs and Higgins JJ were out-
come-oriented, influenced by a desire to see a man with McCawley’s specific 
political convictions appointed to a position which enabled him to pursue 
policies with which they agreed? By the same token, Griffith CJ, Barton and 
O’Connor JJ, as well as Cooper CJ and most of the other members of the 
Supreme Court, held very different political views from those of the Queensland 
Labor Government, and Cooper CJ had clashed heatedly with Premier Ryan on 
more than one occasion. Does this mean that their Honours found fault with 
 
315 See, eg, the exchange between Isaacs and Barton in Official Record of the Debates of the 
Australasian Federal Convention, Adelaide, 26 March 1897, 179–81 (Edmund Barton, Isaac 
Alfred Isaacs); Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Adelaide, 
31 March 1897, 388–9, 392, 394 (Isaac Alfred Isaacs, Edmund Barton). See also Official Record 
of the Debates of the Australasian Convention, Adelaide, 15 April 1897, 641–9 (Henry Bournes 
Higgins); Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Sydney, 9 
September 1897, 259–65 (Henry Bournes Higgins); Official Record of the Debates of the Aus-
tralasian Federal Convention, Sydney, 10 September 1897, 345–51 (Henry Bournes Higgins). 
316 W G McMinn, A Constitutional History of Australia (1979) 137. 
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McCawley’s appointment for partisan reasons? If not, why the remarkable 
coincidence? 
Both sides accepted that Australian law and institutions of government de-
rived, ultimately, from the overarching sovereignty of the United Kingdom 
Parliament. It was also accepted that ordinary political endeavour must be 
pursued within the existing framework of law, and that the locus of legitimate 
law-making and governing power was the system of responsible government 
established under the Constitution of Queensland. Beyond this, however, 
consensus broke down. There was disagreement, both prescriptively and 
descriptively, between the competing ideals of fundamental law and parliamen-
tary sovereignty. There was also disagreement over whether it was practically 
possible or conceptually coherent for there to be a middle ground in which 
Parliament is competent to alter the Constitution of Queensland by ordinary 
legislation, but cannot legislate in a manner that would otherwise be inconsistent 
with the Constitution without first deliberately and explicitly amending it. 
These disagreements were explicitly legal and constitutional, and they engaged 
both positive constitutional law and normative constitutional theory. However, 
they were at the same time clearly related to normative positions of a more 
politico-constitutional character, relating to the nature and function of law and 
government generally. On one hand, law could be conceived essentially as a 
facilitator of private transactions and engagements, and constitutional law as a 
means by which the power of government to make and administer law is defined 
and limited. On the other hand, law could be conceived as a means of stimulating 
social and economic reform, and constitutional law as that which facilitates such 
interventions. 
Closely related to these conceptions of law, moreover, were purely political 
beliefs concerning the functioning of the market economy and the potential for 
economic intervention. The establishment of a special Queensland Arbitration 
Court with power to resolve industrial disputes by granting awards which 
determined wages and other working conditions was clearly an attempt to reform 
the labour market along Fabian socialist lines. The Labor Government’s initia-
tive was obviously political, in a partisan and ideological sense, as was the 
political opposition. The appointment of McCawley, a man who evidently 
sympathised with governmental policy, over other more experienced candidates, 
was just as clearly ideological, partisan and personal in motivation, as was, 
again, the opposition to the appointment. 
Do these connections between the legal, constitutional and adjudicative dimen-
sions, as well as the ideological, partisan and personal dimensions, evident in 
McCawley’s Case, render the judgments of the Supreme Court, High Court and 
Privy Council ultimately ideological, partisan and even personal in character? 
There is no doubt that the judges had relevant political commitments and that 
their legal decisions on the specific constitutional questions were generally 
consistent with these commitments. However, to suggest that their decisions can 
be reduced to either personal animosity, political partisanship or ideological 
prejudice is to go further than the evidence suggests. It is not necessary to appeal 
to personal or partisan motives in order to explain the reasoning and results in 
the cases. The politico-constitutional theory which lies at the intersection of 
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political theory and constitutional theory is sufficient to explain the evidence. 
What does it mean for a state to be a ‘self-governing community’? Where is 
ultimate constitutive authority to be located? Is it to be in the Parliament or in a 
constituent power even more fundamental than this? Competing answers to these 
fundamental questions were invoked by both sides in the litigation. Yet well 
before the specific issues relating to McCawley’s appointment ever came before 
them, the judges had themselves articulated clearly formulated positions on these 
questions. Moreover, as regards the resolution of the case at hand, the particular 
ideological, material or personal reasons why these positions were originally 
adopted were irrelevant. The critical departure point was a difference in poli-
tico-constitutional theory over the nature and location of ultimate constitutive 
authority in Queensland. 
Such a conclusion tends to confirm the approach of legal theorists who empha-
sise that on questions concerning the ultimate constitutional foundations of a 
legal system, moral or political considerations are unavoidably decisive. For 
natural law theorists, such as John Finnis, questions such as these necessarily 
turn on general principles of practical reason, the identification and application 
of which engage moral considerations.317 For legal positivists, such as H L A 
Hart, the identification of the ultimate ‘rule of recognition’ within a legal system 
depends upon a social fact: the attitude of the officials within that system.318 
Hart was not particularly concerned with why particular officials might accept a 
particular rule of recognition as binding; they might do so for moral, traditional, 
conformist or self-interested reasons.319 Finnis, however, has maintained that in 
the ‘central or standard instance’ such reasons will be essentially moral in 
nature,320 and T R S Allan has argued that such questions will turn on the 
‘political theory’ or ‘political morality’ on which the system is based and 
justified. 321  Rolf Sartorius has likewise said that in such cases, the courts 
unavoidably turn to extra-legal moral reasons, which are wrapped up with ‘the 
total judicial theory of the constitution’. 322  Neil MacCormick has similarly 
remarked that: 
possible alternative rulings on fundamental constitutional points must be evalu-
ated in terms of constitutional values as understood by the judges and as ex-
pressed in principles concerning the right basis of authority and allocation of 
authority in the state.323 
 
317 See J M Finnis, ‘Revolutions and Continuity of Law’ in A W B Simpson (ed), Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence (Second Series) (1973) 44; John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980) 
245–54, 266–70. 
318 H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed, 1994) 100. 
319 Ibid 198–9, 226, 257. 
320 Finnis, ‘Revolutions and Continuity of Law’, above n 317, 74–6. 
321 T R S Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism 
(1993) 265–6, following Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986). See also Finnis, Natural Law 
and Natural Rights, above n 317, 281–90. 
322 Rolf Sartorius, ‘Hart’s Concept of Law’ in Robert S Summers (ed), More Essays in Legal 
Philosophy: General Assessments of Legal Philosophies (1971) 131, 151–61. 
323 Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) 133. For further statements of 
‘moral attitude positivism’, see Kent Greenawalt, ‘Hart’s Rule of Recognition and the United 
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The fact that the judges in McCawley’s Case looked, in the final analysis, to 
considerations of a politico-constitutional character to help resolve the case tends 
to corroborate the proposition that judges usually (if not invariably) draw upon 
reasons of political morality — rather than simply traditional, conformist or 
self-interested considerations — when dealing with such questions. From a 
Hartian perspective, McCawley’s Case was technically a ‘hard case’: the judges 
could not avoid exercising a law-making discretion in order to make clear 
whether the amending power in Order in Council cl 22 and Colonial Laws 
Validity Act s 5 meant that the Queensland Parliament could alter the Constitu-
tion Act merely by implication. However, the case was also on the cusp, as it 
were, of the rule of recognition itself. And today, the termination of the legisla-
tive authority of the Imperial Parliament in 1986324 means that the effect of the 
decision in McCawley’s Case has been to transform the amending power 
conferred upon the Queensland Parliament into something resembling an 
ultimate, constitutive power. If Griffith CJ’s interpretation had prevailed, 
however, the rule of recognition in Queensland could well have evolved into 
something of a very different nature indeed. 
Recent assessments of McCawley’s appointments, the case and the constitu-
tional outcome may be enlightening in this respect. Even though McCawley’s 
Case was in its day a highly charged political affair, current appraisals are 
remarkably unanimous on a number of specific points. Most significant amongst 
these is the conclusion that the Privy Council’s ultimate decision effectively 
imposed a system of parliamentary ‘despotism’ upon the people of Queensland. 
Professor R D Lumb, for example, perceived in the decision a ‘thoroughly 
Diceyan approach to parliamentary sovereignty’.325 Likewise, Justice Bruce H 
McPherson has read it as importing Dicey’s doctrine of ‘[a]bsolute legislative 
despotism’, under which ‘an Executive which succeeded in controlling Parlia-
ment occupied a position from which it was able to dominate all the organs of 
State.’326 Indeed, according to Justice McPherson: 
In fashioning an instrument of unlimited power for their own use the politicians 
of that era lacked the wisdom to foresee, or perhaps to care, that control of it 
would one day pass to their opponents. Those who now regret the ambit of Ex-
ecutive authority in Queensland can be in no doubt who were responsible for 
creating it.327 
Most notably, even the current President of the Queensland Arbitration Court, 
D R Hall, recently characterised Dicey’s theory of parliamentary sovereignty — 
on which McCawley’s Case rested — as a ‘dogma’ and a ‘doctrine of legislative 
 
States’ (1988) 1 Ratio Juris 40; Neil MacCormick, ‘The Concept of Law and The Concept of 
Law’ in Robert P George (ed), The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism (1996) 163; 
Richard Holton, ‘Positivism and the Internal Point of View’ (1998) 17 Law and Philosophy 597. 
324 See Australia Act 1986 (Cth) and Australia Act 1986 (UK) c 2, both discussed in Sue v Hill 
(1999) 199 CLR 462, 490–2 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
325 R D Lumb, Australian Constitutionalism (1983) 133. 
326 McPherson, above n 4, 298. Cf Sir Owen Dixon, ‘The Law and the Constitution’ in Severin 
Woinarski (ed), Jesting Pilate: And Other Papers and Addresses (1965) 38, 49. 
327 McPherson, above n 4, 399. 
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despotism.’328 Moreover, reflecting on the initial appointment of McCawley to 
the Queensland Arbitration Court, he has also said that ‘anyone with ears to hear 
would recognise that the position of President had been politicised’.329 Professor 
Malcolm Cope, while also characterising the appointment as ‘political’, has 
certainly endeavoured to make the McCawley appointment at least comprehensi-
ble in terms of Labor Party policy, 330  judging McCawley’s ‘temperamental 
fitness’ and his ‘fundamental political role’ to be ‘vindicated’ by the growth in 
union membership and the integration of unions into the industrial relations 
process under his presidency.331 However, Cope remains sensitive to the issue of 
judicial independence, observing that the decision of the Privy Council ‘gave 
free rein to Parliamentary control of the Judiciary by a simple Act of Parlia-
ment.’332 John Pyke goes even further, expressing regret that the Privy Council 
did not take the opportunity ‘to promote the doctrine of constitutionalism to a 
higher place in State constitutional law’,333 and articulating the hope that the 
High Court might one day revive ‘the sensible and logical doctrine that it had 
developed in Cooper, that a law inconsistent with a State Constitution Act is 
invalid.’334 
One’s assessment of McCawley’s Case may still depend, as Justice McPherson 
has put it, ‘upon the political allegiance of the narrator’.335 However, while a 
number of eloquent and powerfully argued defences of the general doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty have emerged in recent times, 336  criticism of the 
‘legislative despotism’ in Queensland that is said to have resulted from the case 
is widely shared among those who have examined McCawley’s Case in detail. 
The fact that commentators representing a wide range of positions on the 
political spectrum have expressed at least some regret regarding the constitu-
tional consequences of McCawley’s Case may suggest that the issues in the case 
no longer give rise to the sharply divided ideological conflict that they once did. 
Among practising lawyers and legal scholars, at least, a consensus about the 
problematic politico-constitutional implications of the decision seems to have 
developed. 
In the light of this consensus, it is perhaps not surprising that, despite McCaw-
ley’s Case, many aspects of the Australian state Constitutions are today effec-
tively entrenched through manner and form provisions which require special 
procedures to be followed in order to amend the relevant constitutional provi-
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sions.337 Many of these procedures involve the holding of a popular referendum 
or passage of the legislation by a special majority in the relevant Parliament. 
Some, however, are simply concerned to ensure that amendments to constitu-
tional provisions are only enacted following explicit and deliberate consideration 
of the constitutional issues involved — that is, the very point that was at issue in 
McCawley’s Case. For example, Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 85(5) requires 
that constitutional amendments relating to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
of Victoria be made explicitly, rather than by implication. Similarly, the Queen-
sland Constitutional Review Commission recently recommended that the entire 
Constitution Act be entrenched through the requirement that any Bill to amend 
the Constitution of Queensland undergo a delay of one calendar month between 
the First and Second Readings, that there be a report on the Bill by the Legal, 
Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee before the Second 
Reading and that the Bill have the words ‘Constitution Amendment’ in its short 
title.338 The objective here, as for the majority judges of the Supreme Court and 
High Court in McCawley’s Case, was that constitutional amendments should 
only occur deliberately and explicitly, rather than inadvertently and implicitly.339 
The entrenchment of aspects of the state Constitutions represents a qualifica-
tion of the elementary principle determined by the Privy Council in McCawley’s 
Case that the state Parliaments enjoy full power to amend their Constitutions in 
any manner whatsoever. And yet their Lordships clearly recognised the possibil-
ity of such qualifications in stating that the Queensland Parliament is ‘master of 
its own household, except insofar as its powers have in special cases been 
restricted.’340 Thus, McCawley’s Case is fundamental, not only in respect of the 
‘sovereign’ powers of the state legislatures, but also in relation to the effective-
ness of manner and form provisions which place restrictions upon those powers. 
Moreover, while their Lordships did not say so explicitly, it is consistent with the 
reasoning of the Privy Council that any such restrictions would have to be 
derived ultimately from the authority of the Imperial Parliament. Hence, the only 
generally accepted and judicially sanctioned foundation for the effectiveness of 
manner and form provisions depends specifically upon Imperial legislation or 
legislation ultimately derived from Imperial legislation operating in Australia by 
paramount force, initially s 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, and now s 6 of 
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the Australia Act 1986 (Cth), itself based upon the Commonwealth Constitution 
s 51(xxxviii).341 
Significantly, these provisions apply only in respect of laws which concern the 
‘constitution, powers or procedures’ of each state Parliament — they do not 
protect just any provision which happens to be contained within a state Constitu-
tions. 342  Thus, also consonant with McCawley’s Case, the High Court has 
concluded that the existence of Australia Act 1986 (Cth) s 6 leaves little if any 
room for the operation of the wider, so-called ‘Ranasinghe principle’ that ‘a 
legislature has no power to ignore the conditions of law-making that are imposed 
by the instrument which itself regulates its power to make law’.343 As Kirby J 
has suggested, unless the ‘instrument’ in question affords some ‘higher source of 
law’ that is paramount to the legislative powers of the Parliament, the purported 
entrenchment will be ineffective.344 In characterising the Constitution Act as a 
kind of ‘fundamental law’, the majority of the High Court in McCawley’s Case 
were ascribing to that Act paramount force in much the same sense. However, as 
Lord Birkenhead LC pointed out, the problem was the absence of any special 
method by which the Constitution Act had to be amended. Notably, members of 
the High Court have likewise cast doubt upon the legitimacy of manner and form 
provisions inserted into a state Constitution through the ordinary legislative 
process yet which impose more onerous procedures, such as a popular referen-
dum or a special majority, for their amendment.345 
In these diverse ways, McCawley’s Case remains fundamental to state consti-
tutional law in Australia, and yet also in tension with the widespread consensus 
that at least some aspects of the state Constitutions should lie beyond the 
ordinary legislative powers of the state legislatures. Whether, however, this 
broadly felt desire for constitutional restraints on governmental power will 
translate into bipartisan political support for thorough constitutional reform in 
Queensland — or in any of the other Australian states — is of course another 
question. The Parliament of Queensland has recently given the people of 
Queensland a new Constitution,346 but a Constitution truly derived from the 
people — a Constitution of the kind envisaged by Sir Samuel Griffith — has not, 
as yet, materialised. 
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